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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
The paper uses a dualistic, compact and “generic” (macroeconomic) computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model specially constructed for the purpose of investigating the 
implications of trade liberalization for  poverty reduction in South Asia. The model is a 
stylized representation of economies with large populations including large numbers of 
both urban and rural poor as in India, Pakistan or Bangladesh. The current “generic” 
model uses CES production functions and Harris-Todaro type migration model together 
with representative data to generate economy wide results. It is found that a dualistic 
production structure with sufficient details on the labor markets and household side can 
capture some of the effects of trade liberalization on poverty reduction. The model’s 
general equilibrium results suggest that trade liberalization can complement other 
specific policy interventions for poverty reduction.  
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Executive Summary 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to use a “generic” computable general 
equilibrium model in order to understand the poverty reduction impact of trade 
liberalization policies in South Asia. Understanding the impacts of trade liberalization 
policies in South Asia on poverty is important because of the vulnerability of the poor as 
a group in developing economies in general and in South Asia in particular.  
 
  
 There are at least two aspects of any poverty impact analysis for a particular 
policy. These are: i) the impact on economic growth; ii) the impact on income and asset 
distribution. The growth effect on poverty reduction is then given by some estimated 
growth-poverty elasticity. In the second case, a more (less) favorable income/asset 
distribution for the poor may reduce (increase) poverty. A distributional neutrality 
assumption in a model simply allows one to look at the growth aspect by itself. Here, 
too, different sectoral growth rates and different sectors themselves may affect poverty 
differently.  
 
 The paper is structured in such a way that the connection between the basic 
policy issues and the particular modeling approaches can be discussed in a transparent 
manner. It begins with a discussion of the general macroeconomic policy issues arising 
out of program lending and their relevance to the poverty reduction strategy in the 
“post-Washington consensus” policy environment. This raises some relevant questions 
regarding the measurement of poverty and the nature of macroeconomic environment in 
the developing economies. Consequently, it becomes necessary to discuss these 
measurement issues in the context of particular environments in South Asian  
economies. Thus the measurement aspects of poverty are followed up by a discussion of 
some pertinent issues regarding the generic structure of macro-models for South Asian 
economies. A concrete discussion of reforms, in particular, trade liberalization in South 
Asia is taken up next.After this section, the question of what is the relevant class of 
CGE models for an analysis of trade liberalization and poverty in South Asia is 
addressed in section 6. Specifically, this section  explores the questions related to 
income distribution and poverty in CGE models for South Asian developing economies. 
In  the penultimate section (section 7),  I discuss the structure of what has been 
termed the “dual-dual” model. Results from a modified “dual-dual” model using largely 
a data set from India are presented and discussed.  
 
              Within this particular CGE model, the policy experiments show that in 
this region, trade liberalization can lead to further poverty reduction. This is true at both 
the national level and at the level of the various household groups. This is indeed good 
news that conforms to the general prediction of the standard comparative advantage 
based trade theory. 
 
           Under the assumptions of the model, the results  show that in 
general, both the extent and depth of poverty decline for each household group. The 
largest headcount ratio drop is recorded for the rural unskilled group. Poverty severity 
also falls for each household group with the exception of the urban unskilled workers. 
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But when the tariff rates fall from 15 to 12 percent, this group benefits as well. In 
general though, much of the poverty reduction impact of trade liberalization can be 
reaped earlier. Further reductions leading to a rate below 10 per cent may not have much 
more of an impact than earlier tariff reductions. One surprise, however, is the largely 
nonlinear impact of tariff reductions on poverty. There seems to be a big jump 
nationally when the tariff rate is finally reduced to  a low range of 15 to 18 percent.. 
However, there is very little change for even lower rates, for example,  from 15% to 
12%.Given the stylized nature of the exercise, no magical properties need to be 
attributed to these particular  numbers. The general lesson is that tariff reduction will 
ultimately benefit the poor; but the trickling down process is uneven and may require 
some time to work through the socio-economic system.   
 
 
The extent of poverty reduction impact of trade liberalization turns out to be 
limited. There are several reasons for this. The main reason is that the Harris-Todaro 
mechanism allows reverse migration to lower paid jobs for the potentially unemployed 
as protection is removed. Furthermore, the impact of further tariff reductions becomes 
attenuated for most groups when the tariff levels are lowered sufficiently. On the whole, 
the high tariff barriers should be dismantled, but beyond a certain point---say about 15 
per cent average tariff rate--- the further impacts become negligible. 
 
Several policy conclusions can be reached regarding poverty reduction 
strategies in South Asia in light of the findings here. Trade liberalization certainly does 
not conflict with poverty reduction and hence can be pursued without fearing adverse 
poverty impact. However, the approach may need to be a firm but gradual liberalization 
with special sensitivity to agriculture and the rural poor. It should also be kept in mind 
that trade liberalization can certainly help reduce poverty, but by itself it may not be the 
magic bullet against poverty. The actual poverty reduction impact in South Asia is most 
likely to remain small for this policy instrument. Hence other growth enhancing reforms 
need to be pursued simultaneously.   
Furthermore, targeted poverty reduction programs may also be needed with 
emphasis on increasing the efficiency of targeting and improving their 
cost-effectiveness.Programs such as food-for–work and other employment 
schemes,microfinance, agricultural credit etc. need to be pursued with a focus on 
making them more effective in terms of reaching the targeted groups at minimum cost 
to the programs. Rural industrialization and increase in productivity through investment 
in social sectors and human capital also remain viable policy options. In terms of Sen’s 
capabilities approach, the capabilities of the poor--- particularly their basic 
functionings--- need to be enhanced so that they can better participate in income earning 
activities. Some of these policy areas are related to trade, but many are not .This paper 
does not analyze these further policy issues that are not related to trade  directly but the 
need to use existing works along these lines and to continue doing careful research in 
the South Asian context in particular is apparent. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The debate about the impact of globalization on the well-being of people has 
already generated a large literature. 1 Here I focus on one particular aspect of 
globalization, namely, trade liberalization. I also focus on the well-being of one 
particular group, namely, the poor.2 Understanding the impacts of trade liberalization 
on income (and wealth) distribution and poverty is important because of the 
vulnerability of the poor as a group in developing economies. The literature on trade 
liberalization  emphasizes the elimination of distortions leading to both gains from 
trade and  an increase in domestic economic activities leading to sustained growth. To 
the extent that the poor are also beneficiaries of these outcomes, poverty is expected to 
decline. 
 
  However establishing the link between this type of trade liberalization or  trade 
reform in general associated, for example, with WTO entry and poverty reduction 
requires more than just  a description or projection of  trade patterns. A counterfactual 
“no-change” scenario must be compared with an estimated scenario after liberalization. 
An appealing way of addressing this is to formulate and use an appropriate  
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that compares the non-liberalized case 
with scenarios based on trade liberalization. For example,Roland-Holst (2002) and 
(2003) applies a version of the well-known GTAP model to assess the impact of reform 
on trade and income for some regions of  Asia and PRC. His model is aggregated and 
covers 16 countries and 18 sectors with CES production functions.3 Recent work on 
trade and development has also emphasized the importance of considering the response 
of the informal sector to trade liberalization and the importance of modeling specific 
                                                  
1  For a recent survey, see Weiss and Khan (2007), Khan(2007), Khan(2004d), and 
Rahman(2004). 
2 One way to defend this approach theoretically is to appeal to the Rawlsian maximin 
criterion. Alternatively, Sen’s capabilities approach can be used to argue that addressing 
issues related to poverty reduction will help a society towards equalization of capabilities. 
3 See Weiss(2004), pp. 17-19, for a succinct discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of 
such models, and for further details see Roland-Holst (2002), and Lee et. al.(2004). Their 
models are based on Van der Mensbrugghe’s LINKAGE model.A recent documentation with 
technical details can be found in Van der Mensbrugghe(2003) See also, Van der 
Mensbrugghe(1998). More directly relevant to our generic modeling approach with special 
emphasis on poverty reduction is the paper by Stifel and Thorbecke(2003). 
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institutional aspects of particular labor markets.4 The complexity of the links between 
trade and poverty have been analyzed by Alan Winters and his coauthors in 
particular(Winters 2000, 2002 and the references therein). 
 
 
 This paper has two related goals. The first and the main aim is to present a 
“generic”, stylized CGE model for South Asia within which certain policy experiments 
about trade liberalization can be carried out. The second, related objective is to use ‘real 
world’ country data from South Asia to carry out some experiments with respect to the 
progressive removal of tariff barriers. I use largely data from India with some 
exceptions. However the results should be indicative of what can be expected for other 
South Asian economies with large populations and large numbers of poor people in both 
the urban and rural areas. 
 
 The emphasis on poverty reduction at the national and international levels as 
embodied for example, in the Millennium Development Goals, calls for a careful 
methodological approach to the estimation of the poverty reduction impacts of changes 
in macroeconomic, trade and other policy variables. A recent report produced at the 
Asian Development Bank  sorts out many of the complex issues involved at the macro-, 
meso- and micro-economic levels and pinpoints the need for further conceptual and 
modelling work at the appropriate levels of (dis)aggregation(Bolt et.al.2003).The 
identification of the three different levels and treating the meso-economic level as the 
(institutional) link between the other two levels are encouraging in terms of 
understanding the complex causal relations that are involved in understanding and 
reducing poverty.  
 
  There are at least two aspects of any poverty impact analysis for a 
particular policy. These are: i) the impact on economic growth; ii) the impact on income 
and asset distribution. The growth effect on poverty reduction is then given by some 
estimated growth-poverty elasticity. In the second case, a more (less) favorable 
income/asset distribution for the poor may reduce (increase) poverty. A distributional 
neutrality assumption in a model simply allows one to look at the growth aspect by 
itself. Here, too, different sectoral growth rates and different sectors themselves may 
affect poverty differently. (Quibria 2002; Khan 1999; Thorbecke and Jung 1996). Thus 
the dynamic and disaggregated growth impacts of trade liberalization may ultimately be 
the key intervening variables. From this overall perspective, the present endeavor may 
be seen as a first step to capture the poverty impact of trade liberalization through a 
comparative statics experiment in a generic CGE model.  
 
 
 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following section I discuss the 
general macroeconomic policy issues arising out of program lending and their relevance 
to the poverty reduction strategy in the “post-Washington consensus” policy 
environment and trade liberalization. This raises some pertinent questions regarding the 
                                                  
4 See for example, Goldberg, P. K. and N. Pavcnik(2004) and Galiani and Sanguinetti(2004). 
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measurement of poverty and the nature of macroeconomic environment in the 
developing economies. Consequently, in the two sections following immediately, I 
discuss these issues in the context of developing economies. In section 3, I deal with 
some fundamental issues for the measurement of poverty. This is followed up in section 
4 by a discussion of some issues regarding the general structure of macro-models as 
they may relate to the salient characteristics related to the dualistic nature of some South 
Asian economies. Section 5 then takes up the specific issue of recent history of reforms 
in South Asia via a discussion of the Indian case from 1991 to 2004. Section 6 explores 
specifically the questions related to income distribution and poverty in CGE models for 
developing economies in general and for South Asia in particular. In  the penultimate 
section (section 7),  I discuss the structure of what has been termed the 
“dual-dual”class of models and offer a modified version of the Stifel-Thorbecke 
dual-dual model for analyzing the poverty impacts of trade liberalization in South Asia. 
The model is implemented empirically by using largely data from India In the 
concluding section I raise the question of how applicable the model is for other regions, 
e.g., some middle income Asian economies with large pockets of poverty. I end with 
some tentative suggestions regarding poverty analysis in an “extended dual-dual” 
framework for a middle income Asian economy such as Thailand and China as well as 
some other modifications including a more micro poverty analysis. 
 
 At the outset it is fair to mention that even the poverty ‘incidence analysis’ at 
the micro level is not as straightforward as it seems. For example, even cash transfers 
may modify behavior. Such modifications can lead to general equilibrium effects in an 
economy wide set of repercussions. Typically, of course, most transfers are made 
indirectly--- through public spending and indirect taxation. The allocation rules are not 
always transparent and implementation is incomplete or distorted (Bourguignon et. al. 
2002). More relevant to our purpose here, often macroeconomic and structural 
adjustment instruments and outcomes are also involved. The declared purpose of such 
reforms is to enhance economic activity and long-term rate of growth. In the short-run, 
however, the effects may even run in the opposite direction. A careful specification of 
the macro-models and the macro-micro linkage is thus a prerequisite for any meaningful 
and policy-relevant economic analysis. 
 
 Essentially there are three levels that such a relatively complete analysis of 
poverty reduction impacts of macro-policy changes would involve. First level includes 
the macroeconomic tools and models that will allow us to estimate and evaluate the 
impact of various exogenous shocks and policies on macro or aggregate variables such 
as the GDP/capita and its macro-components, the rate of interest, inflation/deflation via 
changes in the aggregate price level, the exchange rate and so on. The time frame must 
also be made explicit. At the second level we need to have tools and procedures for 
disaggregating the values of the variables obtained through our modelling and 
estimation exercises at the first level. Thus, at the end of our procedures at this level we 
will have at our disposal a disaggregated picture of the effects of policies on sectoral 
activities, and returns to factors and households at the appropriate levels of 
disaggregation. The last, bottom layer usually consists of a micro-module where an 
‘incidence analysis’ can be carried out through the manipulation of household micro 
data with the help of relevant theories of distribution, household income generation and 
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consumption.  
 
 Our earlier review of the CGE models (Khan2004a)  revealed that for 
developing economies the useful CGE models can be conveniently categorized in three 
“generational” classes.5 The first generation, starting with the pioneering works of 
Taylor and Lysy (1980) and Adelman and Robinson (1979) in the late 70s and the 80s 
focused increasingly on trade policy issues. The second generation in the late 80s and 
90s made income distribution in the context of structural adjustment policies as the 
main focus, although it must be added that the pioneering works in both the Lysy and 
Taylor volume, and the Adelman-Robinson volume did not neglect distribution. The 
main difference is the explicit reckoning with Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). 
In the late 90s, explicit attention began to be paid to the poverty impact of SAPs within 
a CGE modelling context. In this context, with the Work of Decaluwe et. al. (1999), we 
seem to be in the third generation of CGE models where poverty impact has been 
modeled explicitly. The present work may be said to belong to this “third generation” of 
models for poverty analysis under globalization in a general equilibrium setting for 
Asian Developing Economies(ADEs).6 
                                                  
5 Like all historical classifications of ideas or schools of thought,this one also involves some 
arbitrariness. There is much overlap among the “generations” and at times, prescient 
anticipations of latter work. However, the categorization according to some prevalent 
general features during a particular period can still serve as a convenient marker or 
guidepost if we do not apply it in too rigid a manner.  
6 See also Clautier et. als.(2002) for a review of the CGE literature on the impact of trade 
liberalization on welfare and poverty. Cororaton(2003) is a detailed study of the Philippine 
tariff reform using the CGE-Microsimulation approach. 
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2. Some General Considerations: Trade Liberalization and Poverty Reduction in 
the Post- Washington Consensus Environment 
 
 
The policy environment after the Washington consensus has increasingly moved 
towards both consolidating and augmenting the first generation reforms (Kuczynski and 
Williamson 2003). As is well known, in 1989, John Williamson had dubbed a list of ten 
reforms in Latin America “the Washington consensus”(Williamson 1990). The 
appellation gained wide currency and some may say, even notoriety. It covered the 
following ten points: 
 
1. Budget deficits … small enough to be financed without recourse to the inflation 
tax. 
 
2. Public expenditures redirected from politically sensitive areas that receive more 
resources than their economic returns can justify… toward neglected fields with 
high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as 
primary education, health and infrastructure. 
 
 
3. tax reform … so as to broaden the tax base and cut marginal tax rates. 
 
4. Financial liberalization, involving an ultimate objective of market determined 
interest rates. 
 
 
5. A unified exchange rate at a level sufficiently competitive to induce a rapid 
growth in nontraditional exports. 
 
6. Quantitative trade restrictions to be rapidly replaced by tariffs, which would be 
progressively reduced until a uniform low rate in the range of 10 to 20 per cent 
was achieved. 
 
 
7. Abolition of barriers that impede the entry of new firms or restrict competition. 
 
8. Privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
 
9. Abolition of regulations that impede the entry of foreign direct investment. 
 
 
10. The provision of secure property rights, especially to the informal sector. 
 
As Williamson himself admits, “…from the start, the term “Washington Consensus” 
evoked controversy”. Moreover the mixed results in the decade of the 1990s and the 
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financial crises in Latin America, Asia and Russia led to some recent rethinking and a 
proposal from some economists for an “Augmented Washington Consensus” (Rodrik 
2002). The augmented list includes as “second generation” reform agenda a wide range 
of items from social safety nets and poverty reduction to anti-corruption policies and 
legal and institutional reforms. Some have pointed out that the expanded list sometimes 
expresses hopes and goals rather than specific policies. There is some truth to this. 
However, the expanded list does put the task of poverty reduction squarely on the 
agenda and raises important questions regarding whether and how the program loans 
and the conditionalities attached to them would lead to increased poverty reduction in 
the developing world.7  
 
  In this paper I focus on item no. 6 on Williamson’s list of “first generation” reforms. 
However, it should be acknowledged that the trade liberalization part of the reforms 
usually does not occur in isolation, but rather is part of a larger package of reforms. This 
has certainly been true in South Asia where budgetary retrenchments and other reforms 
have accompanied trade liberalization. 
  
  
 
 
 
On the macroeconomic side, the indirect effects of policy reform including trade 
liberalization on poverty reduction are mainly expected to work through generating 
rapid growth( Berg and Krueger 2003, Srinivasan 2001, Quibria 2002). The 
growth-poverty elasticity is the crucial parameter here. We do have some evidence from 
a survey of the existing macro-models. In particular, the empirical relation between 
growth and poverty (Ravallion and Chen(1997), de Janvry and Sadoulet(1998), 
Agenor(2002)) estimated by using linear regressions where the change in the measured 
levels of poverty are explained by the growth of income or GDP/ capita and other 
variables can offer some useful policy guidance. The main lessons are that growth tends 
to reduce poverty, but the cross-sectional nature of this work makes it hard to apply it to 
any specific country.(see also Bourguignon(2002)). Hence the estimate in the 
cross-section that the poverty elasticity of growth is about 2, is not automatically 
operational for every case. Estimates for particular countries derived from plausible 
models using reliable econometric methodology are necessary.8 The postulation of an 
                                                  
7 There is, of course, the question of whether even the second generation of reforms will 
lead to the kind of sustained growth and poverty reduction that is anticipated. See for 
example, Hayami(2003) for questioning   the view that growth and poverty reduction are 
sustainable. In particular, Hayami raises the issues of infrastructure building and other 
public investment projects  that may still need to be undertaken by the public sector in 
order to make growth and poverty reduction sustainable.See also Naim(1994,2000,2002). 
8 An important ADB document(Weiss 2003) recognizes this point by pointing to the link 
between growth and specific social expenditure categories and refers to some specific 
programs in three different countries. This type of analysis is clearly necessary, but may be 
too disaggregated for macromodels to address. However, much insight can be gained by 
such specific analyses alongside the standard multisectoral macro models. As the document 
points out: 
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automatic trade-poverty reduction causality that works directly and rapidly is a 
hypothesis that needs to be tested, rather than to be accepted as an a priori axiom. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Growth “…would allow greater expenditure to meet social development goals. Whether this 
expenditure is actually made by the public sector will vary depending upon government 
commitments to social targets, although a lack of public sector response can be 
compensated in part by private or NGO provision. Efficiency in public provision of social – 
essentially health and education services – has been addressed by recent program loans for 
these sectors, although their share of total program lending is small. A survey of program 
lending since mid-1999 reveals three main loans aimed explicitly at social development 
goals – the Health and Nutrition Sector Development Policy loan to Indonesia (March 1999), 
the Bangladesh Secondary Education Sector Development Program loan (June 1999) and 
the Bhutan Health Care Reform loan (September 2000). Of these the first aimed at 
maintaining social services in the face of declining government revenue in the wake of the 
Financial Crisis. The other two loans aimed at general improvement in the efficiency of the 
education and health sectors, respectively. Governance issues are addressed directly by 
loans for public sector reform and privatization, as well as by programs designed 
specifically to address the legal and justice system. The more common program lending for 
governance purposes has had as the major objective improved public resource management 
and increased revenue collection capacity; for example the Madhya Pradesh Public 
Resource Management program (December 1999) and the Governance Reform program in 
Mongolia (December 1999). Overtly political governance issues have been addressed in just 
a very small number of cases, notably the Decentralization Support program in Pakistan 
(November 2002) and the Access to Justice program in Pakistan (December 2001).”See also 
ADB(2001;2002a,b,c;2003a,b) 
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3. Measurement of Poverty: Some Fundamental Issues 
 
 
There is by now a vast literature on measurement of poverty. Theoretically, the seminal 
paper was Sen’s 1976 axiomatization and the associated index that attempted to bring 
together the headcount ratio the income gap ratio and income inequalities among the 
poor within a consistent axiomatic framework. Since then, Sen and others following him 
have moved in the direction of a multidimensional approach to poverty as inadequate 
capabilities. However, for the purposes of this paper, I will keep within the income 
poverty concept where a single scalar, money income, is the only relevant variable of 
interest in measuring poverty and computing the various indexes. 
 
 The general intuition behind poverty measurement is that ‘poverty’ exists when 
a group of people in a particular society can not attain a ‘minimum’ level of well-being. 
The ‘minimum’ is at least partly dependent upon the prevailing standards of society. 
However, there are dimensions of well-being such as nutritional requirements that might 
actually constitute an absolute biological minimum. The idea behind absolute as 
opposed to relative poverty is that by using generally agreed upon minimum standards 
of well-being, we can, in fact, define an income poverty line. Such income poverty line 
gives the cut-off point below which everyone is deemed to be poor. The key questions 
in applying this idea of poverty for applied policy issues are: 
 
1. How do we assess well-being? 
2. How do we decide on a certain poverty line so that when a poor person 
crosses that threshold s/he is no longer poor? 
 
These are the questions which ask us to identify who the poor are. Therefore, this can be 
called, using Sen’s terminology, the “identification” of poverty. As a second step, the 
total picture of poverty is arrived at by aggregating. Hence, Sen’s coinage of the term 
“aggregation problem”. Head count ratio is one obvious example in which one simply 
counts the number of people below the poverty line and then divides this number by the 
total number of individuals in a particular society.  
 
 In terms of identifying the poor through the setting of the poverty line, a 
number of issues can arise. The following four questions are one way of raising some 
these issues (Fields 2001): 
 
1. Is the basis income or consumption, and how comprehensively will either 
one be measured? 
2.  What is the income-receiving unit: individual, family, per capita, or adult 
equivalent? 
3. Will there be a single poverty line or will there be separate ones for urban 
and rural areas or different regions of the country? 
4.  Is the poverty line income determined scientifically, politically, subjectively, 
or as a matter of convenience? 
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In terms of both identification and aggregation of poverty, the procedure depends partly 
on axiomatizing the concept of poverty so that any particular measure has a number of 
desirable properties. The most common axioms are focus, anonymity, population 
homogeneity, monotonicity or strong monotonicity, and distributional sensitivity. 
Among the commonly used indexes, the head count ratio fails both the strong 
monotonicity and distributional sensitivity axioms. 
 
 Since Sen's (1976) axiomatic treatment of poverty comparisons several new 
indexes of poverty have emerged. Among them is the one developed by Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (FGT).  
 
 The FGT index which we will meet later again as the index used most 
frequently in the macroeconomic models incorporating poverty analysis has many 
desirable properties. In addition to satisfying the monotonicity and distributional 
sensitivity axioms, it also has the property of being additively sub-group decomposable. 
This means that the index is decomposable by subgroups (according to region, income 
class etc.) among the poor.  
 
 Thus this index can take into account the intensity of poverty for different groups 
of poor people. This is done by looking at the deprivation of calories. The poverty measure 
is given by: 
 
 
 
                 p  = 1/n Σ (Gj / z)a 
 
 
where  n = total population 
  q = the number of poor 
  z = the poverty line 
  Gj = food expenditure shortfall of the jth individual (j = 1,2,…,q ) 
 
In the simulation a value of a = 2 is used. At a lower value of ‘a’ some of the axioms are 
violated. At a higher value of ‘a’ the shortfalls of the poorer segments are weighted more 
heavily; therefore the intensity of deprivation by the poorer segments (in particular the 
poorest) will be magnified for value of ‘a’ greater than 2. For this value of `a’ both the 
monotonicity and transfer axioms of Sen are satisfied. We may recall that both these 
axioms have to do with the sensitivity of the index to the incomes of the poor as opposed 
to simply the number of poor. Thus, the monotonicity axiom states that, ceteris paribus, a 
decrease in the income of a poor person should increase the poverty index. The transfer 
axiom states that, ceteris paribus, a transfer of income from a lower income poor person to 
a higher income poor person increases the poverty index. It can be checked easily that this 
is true for the FGT index when a = 2. 
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4. Macroeconomic Models for Developing Economies: Some Characteristics 
Related to Dualism in South Asia 
 
 
   
It is well known that the developing economies have special features that need to be 
recognized. Below, I first discuss some of these aspects of developing economies from 
the macroeconomic modelling perspective that will be relevant for.formulating a 
“generic” model for South Asia. Later in this section, a brief discussion of some “micro” 
institutional features that are also relevant for poverty reduction strategies in South Asia 
in particular, are mentioned in order to round out the discussion. From the 
macroeconomic side, the following points are important9: 
 
1) First, there must be an accounting framework and behavioral equations 
capturing some key aspects of macroeconomic modelling for developing 
countries. The most straightforward way of giving economic content to a set 
of aggregate accounting relationships is by adding appropriate behavioral 
equations and equilibrium conditions. 
 
2) The accounting relationships that are relevant for a particular case depend on 
the structure of the economy. There could, for example, be a) “benchmark” 
accounting framework; b) particular features, modelling aspects such as 
alternative choices of disaggregation of production and consumption, 
structural features of labor market, degree of development of the financial 
system etc.  c) behavioral functions, liquidity constraints on aggregate 
consumption; credit and foreign exchange rationing, debt overhang and its 
effects on production and private investment uncertainty and irreversibility 
effects on investment decisions; effects of financial repression, currency 
substitution, and informal financial markets on money demand etc. 
 
3) Fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies in developing countries are 
important features in most models.  Data must cover a wide range of 
variables including industrial output, prices, wages, various monetary 
aggregates, domestic private sector credit, fiscal variables, exchange rates 
and trade variables. 
 
4) Nature and implications of fiscal rigidities and the effect of fiscal deficits on 
a variety of macroeconomic variables are also important. 
 
5) Developing country fiscal problems require special attention. Some of the 
most important features here are:  high tax rates levied on a narrow tax base 
and heavy reliance on revenues from financial repression and multiple 
                                                  
9  See also, Agenor and Montiel (1999), Thorbecke and Morrison(1989), 
Khan(1983,1996,1997), Khan and Sogabe(1994), Khan and Sonko(1994) Khan and 
Thorbecke(1988),and Fields(2001). 
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currency practices, on the inflation tax, and on excessive debt financing. 
 
6) Exchange rates modelling require special attention as well. In particular, one 
needs to identify special features such as “fixed” with rationing and 
simultaneous transactions in parallel markets when these are present.  
Credibility and inflation under a fixed exchange rate regime also need 
particular attention. The association of quasi-fixed exchange rates with 
currency and financial crises makes this issue specially significant. 
Contractionary effects of devaluation may also destabilize the economy, and 
could be included as a theoretical possibility that may sometimes become a 
practical problem. 
 
7) The role of labor markets in the context of short-run macroeconomic 
adjustment in developing countries is particularly important for analyzing 
the poverty reduction implications of macroeconomic policies. More 
specifically, labor market segmentation and sectoral wage rigidity need 
special attention. 
 
8) It should also be recognized that by now there are both orthodox and 
“heterodox” programs and models of structural adjustment in developing 
economies.  Alternative models of inflationary process are also available. 
However, the approach I have adopted here is intended to skirt unnecessary 
terminological (and at times, ideological) controversy. This ‘ecumenical 
approach’--- to use Sherman Robinson’s felicitous term--- adopted here is 
more concerned with the real contents of the models and their real world 
policy relevance. 
 
9) Macroeconomic dynamics associated with monetary and exchange rate 
policy rules in a context where international capital mobility is imperfect 
need to be emphasized. 
 
10) Three important issues that models must focus on in the context of 
exchange-rate based disinflation programs in developing economies are: i) 
output, ii) interest rates, iii) real wages. 
 
11) It should be pointed out that with humility that none of the modelling 
approaches that are widely used in developing countries is at present able to 
adequately address the complex dynamic interactions between stabilization, 
growth and distribution. This makes the intermediate and longer-term 
analysis of issues related to external debt, capital inflows, and currency 
crises particularly difficult. 
 
 Trade and financial liberalization and macroeconomic performance likewise 
become issues where the dynamic aspects are often treated simplistically. 
Problems of short-run macroeconomic management during the liberalization 
process are also well known and need little commentary. 
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12) Political factors in the adoption and abandonment of stabilization and 
structural adjustment programs in developing countries effects are also of 
obvious importance, but are very difficult to incorporate in the standard 
macroeconomic models of applied general equilibrium variety. For example, 
it would obviously be important to include the effects of the presidential and 
parliamentary electoral cycle on the pattern of public spending in many 
Asian and Latin American countries. One could also make the same case for 
including an analytical framework for examining the linkage between 
exchange rate policy and electoral cycles. 
 
Some questions that are relevant rise in light of the features discussed above are: 
 
a. What structural changes need to be preceded by macroeconomic 
stabilization? Or, alternatively, can the two proceed concurrently? 
 
b. What is the proper sequencing of the liberalization and reform measures ? 
 
c. What “structural” differences between developed and developing economies, 
and “structural” similarities among the latter. Are relevant to model? 
 
In response to the third question above, the following shared structural characteristics 
may be important: 
 
1) Many agents possess significant market power 
 
2) Macroeconomic causality in developing countries tends to run from 
“injections” such as investment, exports, and government spending to 
“leakages”, such is imports and saving; 
 
3) Money is often endogenous 
 
4) The structure of the financial systems can influence macroeconomic 
outcomes in important ways 
 
5) The role of imported intermediate and capital goods as well as direct 
complementarity between public and private investment are empirically 
important. 
 
Partly as a consequence of these features some have questioned the wisdom and 
efficiency of orthodox short-run macroeconomic policy prescriptions, particularly 
“shock treatment” in the form of fiscal austerity coupled with devaluation and tight 
monetary policy. 
 
 Disagreements among modelers also exist with respect to the identification of 
the source of inflation. The key controversy is about whether one should ascribe an 
accommodative rather than a causal role to money supply growth. According to the 
nonmonetarist view frequently the source of inflation is slow relative productivity 
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growth in agriculture (arising from poor land distribution and land tenure patterns) 
combined with administered prices (arising from noncompetitive market procedures and 
implying downward price rigidities) in industry, together with wage indexation. 
Monetary policy is perceived to be passive in the face of these already pervasive 
inflationary forces.  Moreover, in part because of the roles of working capital and 
imported inputs, and in part because substitution possibilities are more limited than 
assumed by the proponents of orthodox macroeconomic management, a policy package 
combining devaluation with tight fiscal and monetary policies will result in stagflation 
in the short-run with little or no improvement in the external accounts.  The alternative 
new structuralist policy prescription is not always clear, but it would in all likelihood 
contain a greater element of gradualism, direct intervention, and employ many of  the 
means of medium term resolution of  structural problems that are contained in 
traditional stabilization programs. 
 
 For the sake of parsimonious modelling, quite often a three good modelling 
approach is adopted. The three aggregated goods are non-traded domestic good, 
exportable good, and importable good.10 Here, too, some important differences between 
the developed and developing countries need to be kept in mind. For example, 
 
1) Developing economics, like small industrial countries, tend to be much more 
open to trade in goods and services than are the major industrial countries. In 
1995 trade share of developing countries was 45% compared to G-7s trade 
share of 25 percent. 
 
2) Developing countries typically have little control over the prices of goods 
they export and import. In particular, they often face exogenous terms of 
trade. 
 
3) Over half of the exports typically consist of agricultural and primary 
commodities. Such an export structure needs to be modeled explicitly. The 
Mundell-Fleming model which has long been the work-horse of open 
economy industrial country model, assumes endogenous terms of trade 
determination, with the domestic economy completely specialized in the 
production of a good over which it exerts significant market power. The 
production structure most suitable for the analysis of developing country 
macroeconomic phenomena is instead likely to be the Salter-Swan dependent 
economic model or (as mentioned before) a three good model consisting of 
exportables, importables, and nontraded goods. 
 
Such a production structure permits a distinction to be drawn between the exogenous 
terms of trade and an endogenous real exchange rate, which is the central intertemporal 
macroeconomic relative price in these economies. 
 
 In terms of the exogenous prices faced by the typical developing economy, 
                                                  
10 Later in the case of the “dual-dual” approach to modelling, we will find basically the 
same classification scheme. However, the number of production sectors in the particular 
model discussed in section 7 is four. The reasons will be explained in section 7. 
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both oil and non-oil commodities prices fluctuate a great deal.   
The extent of external trade in assets have tended to be more limited in developing 
countries than in developed countries although this situation has recently begun to 
change in dramatic fashion for an important group of developing economies. The 
resulting instabilities however have also caused serious dislocations. In particular the 
increase in poverty in the affected Asian economies after the Asian Financial Crisis from 
July 1997 on should be kept. 
 
 In particular, the macroeconomic consequences of pegging, of altering the peg 
(typically devaluation) and of the rules for moving the peg are of particular importance 
in macro-modelling in developing countries. It is also useful to remind ourselves in 
trying to model the financial sectors that financial markets in many developing countries 
have long been characterized by the prevalence of rudimentary financial institutions. 
This is of particular relevance in analyzing the impact of policies on poverty reduction 
in low-income countries.  
 
 In light of the above, it should be apparent that in the modelling of these 
economies some macro-behavioral relationships may need to be modified. For example, 
we may need to incorporate the implications of credit and foreign exchange rationing in 
private decision rules where such rationing is present.  This will affect, for instance, 
private consumption, investment, asset demand, export supply and import demand 
functions.  
 
 
Some Relevant Aspects of Public Sector Behavior  
 
The Government Budget is another important segment of a macro-model requiring 
careful handling. In particular, we need to remember that the composition of the 
government budget differs markedly between industrial and developing countries.Even 
though reduction of government expenditures and the omnipresence of state has been on 
the agenda of the IFIs and national policy makers for at least two decades, there are still 
some lingering features. Perhaps the state is no longer as much of a behemoth as in the 
past. Nevertheless, a prominent role of the state in many developing economies is 
reflected through the following factors, among others:  
 
a. nonfinancial public sector – central government, local governments, 
specialized agencies, and nonfinancial public enterprises; 
 
b. financial institutions owned by the government; 
 
c. the central government absorbs a smaller fraction of output of developed 
countries than in developing countries; 
 
d. the composition of spending differs between the two groups of countries. 
Developing countries spend proportionately more of their budget on general 
public service, defense, education and other economic services.  Developed 
countries spend more on health and substantially more on social security. 
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e. Revenue:  tax collection is hindered by limited administrative capacity and 
political constraints. This means that direct taxation plays a much more 
limited role than in developed countries.  Direct taxes, taxes on domestic 
goods and services, and taxes on foreign trade account for roughly equal 
shares of total tax revenue in developing countries; in industrial countries 
income taxes account for the largest shares and taxes on foreign trade are 
negligible.  In developing countries, the share of tax revenue raised from 
individuals is much higher than corporate income tax. 
 
f. greater reliance on seigniorage (change in base money stock divided by 
nominal GDP).  Seigniorage and inflation are positively related.  
 
 
Three other dimensions of the budget institutions that have relevance for both growth 
and poverty reduction have been much discussed recently: 
 
i. The nature and credibility effects of the constitutional rules that can be 
implemented to impose constraints on the size of the fiscal deficit, e.g., the 
balanced budget rule  
 
ii. The procedural rules that guide the articulation and elaboration of the budget 
by the executive branch, its approval by the legislative branch, and its 
execution. 
 
iii. The type of rules (whether collegial or hierarchical) that may enhance the 
transparency of the budgetary process e.g., Debt/ GDP upper limit constraint. 
 
 
Aggregate Supply and Labor Markets: some further issues 
 
Aggregate supply and the labor market are aspects that need some further attention 
before we close our discussion of institutional and macroeconomic aspects of 
macro-modelling. Here it is important to point out that through the cost of intermediate 
inputs that are imported; the exchange rate has an important influence on the position of 
the economy’s short-run supply curve (SRSC). 
 
 SRSCs in developing countries may be significantly affected by working 
capital considerations.  Many have claimed that costs of working capital tend to give 
interest rates and credit availability an important short-run supply-side role, although 
this is controversial and the empirical evidence is mixed.11  
                                                  
11 See Agenor, Pierre-Richard and Peter J. Montiel, Development Macroeconomics and the 
references there   
for evidence on the empirical importance of the costs of financing working capital in 
Argentina and Korea respectively.  If empirically relevant, the role of working capital in 
the short run supply curve would imply, for instance, that contractionary monetary policy 
may have short-term stagflationary consequences. 
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 Although labor market institutions vary substantially across developing 
countries, the informal sector continues to play an important role in the determination of 
wages and employment in many of them.  The modelling of short-run wage-setting 
behaviour represents one of the key differences between some of the major schools of 
modern macroeconomics, but most participants in the disputes acknowledge that 
country-specific institutional differences (such as the prevalence of staggered 
overlapping contracts in the U.S. or synchronized wage bargaining in Scandinavia) are 
important in determining the economy’s SRSC.  In this context, the role of 
economy-wide backward indexation mechanism in the context of disinflation programs 
has been studied extensively. Developing countries, as is well known, often have 
disguised unemployment. What is less well known is the prevalence of flexibility in 
many of the developing country labor markets as well. It would appear from the 
available evidence that many developing country labor markets have a high degree of 
real wage flexibility (Horton et al., 1994). Thus, for proper modelling of these markets 
in developing economies, a properly nuanced mix of flexibility and rigidity in specific 
labor markets is called for, rather than following one specific characterization for all 
labor markets. 
 
 As a result of the foregoing, the macroeconomic environment in developing 
countries is often much more volatile than that in industrial countries.  The 
fundamental causes of the macroeconomic instability in developing countries are both 
external and internal.  Small developing countries are price takers in the international 
markets for goods and services as well as financial assets.  Therefore, these countries 
are directly affected by volatility in international markets. If we add to this the 
inflexibility and paucity of domestic macroeconomic instruments and we then face get a 
situation that is not easily amenable to control.  There is also political instability in 
many countries resulting in frequent jumps in policy regimes.  Such regime switch in a 
weak institutional environment creates the unfortunately typical developing countries 
scenario of a macroeconomic trajectory punctuated by a series of crises.  
 
 To sum up, economic boom and bust are much more prevalent in developing 
countries than developed countries.  Such a history of macroeconomic volatility has 
serious economic costs-sometimes reaching into double-digit percentage points (See 
Khan, 2004b).   
 
 The above discussion is intended to give a fair summary of what is special 
about development macroeconomics.  However, in order to link poverty analysis to the 
macromodels, more explicit recognition of the nature of market imperfections and of 
informal institutions that arise to fill the gaps is necessary.  The literature in this area 
has experienced a tremendous explosion drawing on advanced work in game theory and 
the economics of information.12  These new approaches try to explain empirical 
institutional features that include the following (Mookherjee and Ray, 2001). 
                                                  
12 See for example, the papers collected in D. Mookherjee and D. Ray, Readings in the Theory of 
Economic Development, Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, 2001, for a representative sample.  See also, P. 
Bardhan and C. Udry.  Development Microeconomics, Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1999, Hayami, 
Development Economics (1997) and Otsuka(2001,2000). 
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1) Fragmented credit markets; 
 
2) Segmented labor markets; 
 
3) Lack of market clearing manifested in unemployment and credit rationing; 
 
 
4) Co-presence of different types of contracts, e.g., tenancy contracts of both 
fixed rent and share cropping varieties; 
 
5) Pervasive long-term relationships between borrowers and lenders, employers, 
and employees, or farmers and traders; 
 
6) Dual labor markets in which some workers enter into long-term contracts 
while others are employed to carry out similar task without such contracts at 
a lower level of wages; 
 
7) Interlinked transactions and exclusive dealing between specific groups of 
agents across many markets for instance, credit and tenancy may be bundled 
together.  Likewise, credit may also be bundled with employment or 
marketing contracts; 
 
8) Asset ownership is the key to access to credit, tenancy or employment 
markets.  Thus the poor have limited or no access to credit because they 
lack collateral assets.  The poor also have limited or no access to 
employment owing to malnutrition, debilitating diseases or low levels of 
human capital. 
 
9) Small farms show higher yields even when the large farms have better access 
to credit and technology. 
 
10) Some markets such as the market for land sales are quite thin, leading to the 
persistence of tenancy and unequal land ownership in spite of the superior 
productivity of owner cultivated small farms. 
 
11) Informal cooperatives and kinship networks are significant determinants of 
access to credit, insurance, technological information, water and common 
lands. 
 
As Stiglitz (1994) and others have pointed out, the standard Arrow-Debreu model with a 
complete set of markets and optimizing agents cannot explain these phenomena.  
However, models using game theory and the approach of information economics largely 
pioneered by Stiglitz have amassed an impressive analytical record in explaining these 
features.  While macromodels cannot be expected to accommodate all these features, 
in detail, at least the labor and credit markets need to be modeled carefully.  This point 
is beginning to be recognized by development macroeconomists of virtually all 
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persuasions (Agenor and Montiel, 1999). 
 
 In South Asia in particular many of these features which are distortions of the 
standard neoclassical general equilibrium model are still observed. One objective of 
reforms has been to give these economies more of a market orientation to varying 
degrees. The Indian case is illustrative. I turn next to a brief discussion of the post-1991 
reforms in India with particular attention to reforms in the  area of international trade. 
 
 
5. An Example of Economic Reform in South Asia:India 1991-2004 
 
 
For its  May 4, 1991 issue, the Economist chose the image of a tiger in a cage for the 
cover of an in-depth survey of the Indian economy.13 The Indian economy was indeed 
in deep trouble. There were both short run problems of stabilization related in particular 
to problems of external balance and lack of reserves, and medium and long term issues 
of structural reforms including trade and financial liberalization. 
 
In 1991, after the balance of payments crisis hit India, Dr. Manmohan Singh, a 
professional economist and an economic administrator, was appointed Finance Minister. 
Manmohan Singh is undoubtedly the architect of the most far reaching reforms in India 
since independence in 1947. Despite initial resistance, his personal integrity was a big 
factor in the eventual acceptance of some major policy shifts. However, from the 
mid-90s, there was increased criticism of both the  results of the reforms---particularly 
on the distributional side--- and their inadequate formulation(Virmani 2004). In 
response, government economists such as Dr. Arvind Virmani took upon themselves the 
task of clarifying the goals, objectives and methods of the reform package. 
 
Acoording to these Indian economists, there were two main objectives. One was to 
promote competition by eliminating protection. The other was to “…simultaneously” 
increase  “… the ability of producers to meet such competition by removing policy 
barriers and distortions.”14 Clearly, trade liberalization was and remains an important 
plank of these reforms. 
 
Although 1991 is convevtionally given as the year when big changes began, the reform 
process itself was begun in the 80s.15 However, the emergency in 1991 led to both a 
painful stabilization package to handle the short run external balance problems and also 
to the longer term reform agenda of dismantling the ‘licence raj’, giving market forces a 
bigger role to play. 
                                                  
13 I am grateful to Amartya Sen for drawing my attention to this. See also, Dreze and 
Sen(2002) chapter 9, “Well Beyond Liberalization” for a deep and insightful assessment and 
suggestions for the future course of the Indian economy. 
14 Virmani(2004), p. 17. 
15 See Virmani(2004). Dr. Kurian of the National Institute of Public Finance made some 
particularly  insightful observations regarding the continuity of social objectives such as 
poverty reduction, and the moderation and relatively nonideological stance of leaders such 
as Manmohan Singh in particular. 
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Focusing on trade liberalization in particular, a considerable increase in exports took 
place with tariff reduction and removal of other barriers. Prior to the reforms all imports 
were either submitted to licensing or prohibited altogether. All bulk items such as 
cereals, petroleum, mineral ores, metals, fertilizers etc. could be imported only by 
specified government agencies. Hence the market structure was close to being a 
monopsony. There was also a massive increase in tariff rates in the 1980s. 
 
As Joshi and Little(2001,pp64-65) argue forcefully, there were not good reasons 
for the level of protection that the inefficient manufacturing sector had enjoyed 
historically. As they also note, the really significant change on the import side was the 
introduction of a ‘negative’list. Any item not on the list could be imported freely except 
for some bulk items still controlled by the government agencies in mid-90s. 
 
In accordance with trade theory the import of consumer goods in line with 
consumer preferences should enhance welfare. The long standing official Indian attitude 
towards foreign made consumer goods seems to have reversed itself. After making the 
people to suffe through many homemade goods of lower quality produced inefficiently, 
the trade policy liberalization has led to an increase of imported consumption goods. 
 
On the export side, quantitative export restrictions came under attack. The list of 
restricted items has indeed shrunk as a result. Export promotion schemes are also being 
pursued with more than usual vigor. However, many export promotion schemes still 
carry large administrative costs are quite complex in practice. 
 
India’s main success in trade reform has been in the area of tariffs. In 1990-91, 
the unweighted average tariff was 125 per cent. That figure came down to 71 percent in 
1993-94. The peak tariff rate in 1990 was an unbelievably high 355 percent. The peak 
rate in 1993-94 came down to 85 per cent. In 1995 the highest rate of tariff was further 
reduced to 50 percent. Today the average tariff rate is only 18 percent with the peak rate 
below 30 per cent. For this reason, in the  policy experiments that follow in section 7, I 
concentrate on exploring the effect of tariff reduction on poverty reduction.  
    
One last observation relates to the elections of 2004 and the replacement of the 
BJP government with the Centrist government headed by Dr. Manmohan Singh and 
supported--- with occasional criticisms--- by the left from outside the government. 
Initially there were great fears in the financial markets that a more populist regime will 
undermine the reforms if not reverse them altogether. That fear was calmed when 
Manmohan Singh became the prime minister with Mr. Chidambaram as  the finance 
minister. However, the government has honestly admitted the failure of reforms to 
benefit the poor and the ruaral sectors in general. Along with the continuation of 
reasonable reforms, the government seems to be sincerely committed to the goal of 
poverty reduction.16 
 
                                                  
16 At least this is the consensus position I heard frequently from government advisers in 
the ministry of finance, planning commission members, private think tanks, university 
professors and political leaders during my visit to India in July 2004. 
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6. Towards A Generic CGE Model for South Asian Trade Liberalization  
 
      6.1: What is the “appropriate” class of CGE models for dualistic economies? 
 
In order to discuss how to incorporate poverty analysis in a CGE model, we need a 
clear understanding of the structure of CGE models as such. As a first step in 
understanding the CGE models, we can start with the Walrasian “fundamentalist” 
approach to general equilibrium. Essentially, the problem here is to find a set of prices 
(a price vector) that will clear all markets.17 
 
The producers maximize profit and the consumers maximize utility. All markets 
including futures markets must exist and all uncertainty must be subject to actuarial 
calculation of risk 18 . It is clear that while theoretically elegant and analytically 
impressive, the conditions in many actual economies do not approximate this theoretical 
model. 
 
In the Keynesian type macroeconomic models at any rate, there  can also be 
underemployment equilibrium. There is thus a tension between such macroeconomic 
models and the Walrasian general equilibrium models where full price flexibility 
ensures full employment at market clearing wage level. 
 
As Robinson (2003) observes: 
 
The literature on CGE models is replete with debates about the macro properties of 
these models, and a number of different schools of thought have emerged concerning 
how, or indeed whether, one should incorporate macro features into these SAM-based 
models. No clear consensus has emerged, which is hardly surprising since the debate 
really concerns the theoretical dividing line between Walras and Keynes, and the micro 
foundations of macro models--- or the lack thereof. (p. 1) 
 
 
It is not relevant here to outline the contours of this debate, except to keep in mind 
that neither the fully Walrasian nor the standard Keynesian model is likely to 
correspond exactly to the actualities of a developing economy.  However, we need to 
keep firmly in mind that a CGE model in its origin--- and initial historical 
development--- is Walrasian in spirit. 
 
 At the applied level, a CGE model incorporates all the flow variables 
                                                  
17 Actually, it is necessary and sufficient for all but one of the markets to be in equilibrium. 
As is well known, by “Walras’  law” when all  but one markets clear, the last one must 
clear also. 
18 Formally, the maximization of expected utility must be possible. For this, an axiomatic 
characterization was given by von Neumann and Morgenstern. A necessary condition is the 
possibility of expressing all states as quantifiable probability distributions.  
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that can be captured in a SAM. 19 The origins of social accounting can be traced 
as far back as Gregory King’s efforts in 1681, but more recent work stems from the 
attempts by Richard Stone, Graham Pyatt, Erik Thorkbecke and others. 20  The 
relkevant SAM accounts must be specified clearly for the particular CGE model one 
wishes to construct and implement. 
 
These accounts will usually include production activities, factorial income distribution 
and household income distribution among other variables. The importance of both the 
factorial income distribution and household income distribution for poverty analysis in a 
CGE model are intuitively obvious. However, proper modelling strategy for these 
distributions in a CGE model is far from obvious. Later, we will have an occasion to 
deal with the issues that arise in this context in some concrete examples of CGE models 
for poverty analysis, and finally to formulate an appropriate model for South Asia 
incorporating the dualistic structure of South Asian economies. 
 
As implied before, the Walrasian spirit of a CGE model is shown in its 
determination of only relative prices, with some price index being chosen as the 
numeraire. The model also incorporates the assumption of ‘no money illusion’--- all 
supply and demand equations are homogeneous of degree zero with respect to 
prices.21 If all prices are multiplied by a fixed number, the equilibrium quantities do 
not change at all. 
 
 As a matter of historical record, it has been a standard practice of CGE 
modelling to specify fixed supplies of factors of production such as various types of 
labor and capital, or aggregate indexes of these, and carry through the implications of 
the assumption that all markets must clear. These “classical” CGE models calibrate 
wage and rental rates to employ all of the exogenously specified labor and capital. In 
many “applications”, the guiding idea has been to introduce distortions to the 
‘equilibrium price vector’ and calculate the resulting inefficiencies. In this sense, CGE 
models have been used as a normative check for distortions and their costs against the 
benchmark of a Walrasian market clearing price system.22 
 
 There is also much discussion in the CGE modelling literature about the 
various “closure rules” for the models. The discussion about macro-closures, initiated 
by Sen (1963), was revived by Taylor and Lysy (1979) who found that the choice of 
macro-closure to a large extent affected the policy simulation results obtained with a 
CGE model. As the previous discussion already indicates, the macroeconomic 
                                                  
19 For a succinct discussion of some of the relevant features of the applied models for policy 
analysis, see Yao, Shujie and Aying Liu, “Policy Analysis in a General Equilibrium 
Framework” Journal of Policy Modelling, 22(5):589-610, 2000. 
20 For a description of SAM as a data gathering device, see G. Pyatt and E. Thorbecke, 
Planning Techniques for a Better Future (Geneva:  ILO, 1976). See also 
Khan(1983,1997,1998,2004b) and, Khan and Thorbecke(1988,1989). 
21 In macroeconomic terms, we can include the assumption of neutrality of money. And thus 
create a ‘classical’ model. 
22 It should be noted, however, that the assumption of full employment means that the 
economy is at the wrong point of the (multidimensional) production possibilities frontier, 
not inside it. 
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modelling is forced to depart from the Walrasian assumptions embodied in a 
“fundamentalist” CGE model. This also leads to the “closure rule problem”. Because 
the short-run macro CGE models do often deviate from the Walrasian closure, a separate 
literature has grown up around the various alternatives.  
 
 There are mainly two ways to interpret and define the closure rule problem. In 
mathematical terms, the problem boils down to the simple notion that the model should 
consist of an equal number of equations and endogenous variables.23 Thus, the closure 
rule problem is the decision the model builder has to make on which variables are 
endogenous and which variables are exogenous. Alternatively, if the model is built in 
the Walrasian tradition and all decisions are based on optimizing behavior, the closure 
rule problem involves the introduction of macroeconomic constraints that impinge upon 
the microeconomic behavior of individual agents. One then needs to introduce 
additional balancing equations. (Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 1997). In general, a closure rule 
is determined by the theoretical preferences of the model builder and, in her view, 
empirically the most plausible adjustment processes. 
 
 In the early works that used CGE models for development policy work, much 
time was spent in finding ways to model the various distortions in the foreign trade 
sectors. Thus, modelling exports, imports, balance of trade and balance of payments 
became important items on the modelling agenda during the 1980s. After trying various 
approaches, a general consensus was reached. The consensus approach admits imperfect 
substitutability between imported goods and their domestic counterparts. The 
Armington assumption is invoked by almost all modelers.24 The Armington assumption 
regarding imperfect substitutability has been extended to the modelling of exports as 
well. The most common approach now is to specify sectoral constant elasticity of 
substitution(CES) import demand functions, export transformation functions that 
assume constant elasticity of transformation(CET) and aggregation functions based on 
these.25 
 
 We may recall that starting with Hume and his price-specie flow mechanism, 
the classically inspired trade theories have implied a trade balance of zero in 
equilibrium. But in the real world data the trade balance is rarely zero. Does this mean 
that the equilibrium assumption is somehow violated? The most widely practiced way 
of handling this nonzero trade balance is to make it exogenous. Typically, trade 
imbalances find their counterpart in the saving-investment imbalance. 
 
 Looked at in this way, trade imbalances can be treated as foreign saving 
flowing in with a trade deficit, and of savings flowing abroad when trade balance is 
positive. However, this does raise the question of why people at home or abroad would 
be willing to save and lend--- a question that can only be answered in an explicitly 
                                                  
23 More precisely, the system must satisfy solvability conditions. For a linear system this 
means that the number of linearly independent equations must equal the number of 
endogenous variables. 
24 See Armington(1969). 
25 The theoretically inclined reader will recognize this as being in line with the Salter-Swan 
model. 
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intertemporal model. Thus, static CGE models which treat trade balance as exogenous 
are, in fact, compressions at a point in time of a more fully specified intertemporal 
equilibrium model. 
 
 There is also the related issue of how to bring in balance the traded with the 
nontraded sector, and the domestic economy with the rest of the world. This is done by 
making flexible another relative price. This is the relative price of traded and nontraded 
goods, or under the purchasing power parity and small country assumption, the real 
exchange rate. Naturally, modelers tend to specify an implicit functional relationship 
between the real exchange rate and the trade balance. Increased flow of foreign savings 
raises the relative price of nontraded goods which is equivalent to an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate in these models (Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson, 1993). There is a 
shift of production away from exports goods producing sectors to nontraded goods and 
services. Consumers shift demand to cheaper imports and the new trade balance equals 
the exogenous flow of higher foreign savings.26 
 
 This is perhaps a good place to shift our attention from foreign savings to 
domestic savings and investment, with the role of the government as a key 
macroeconomic entity.  In a flow description of the economy via the SAM accounts 
the savings-investment account collects savings and spends money on investment goods. 
The flow equilibrium condition is that savings must equal investment. Some mechanism 
is clearly needed to achieve this balance, as our previous discussion of the closure rules 
already indicated. 
 
 The common strategy here is to specify savings parameters by household types. 
These fixed parameters map income to savings. A fairly common (neoclassical) 
assumption is also to assume that all savings are spent on investment. Thus under this 
closure rule there is no “paradox of thrift”. Either through loanable funds markets or a 
more direct allocation rule( this is often the case), savings are translated into investment. 
However, this is not the only way to relate savings and investment, and even here, as the 
reference to the loanable funds markets hints, the full specification of a ‘savings-driven’ 
model on the financial side is often missing. Important questions regarding the 
saving-investment links need to be raised. These include: why save at all ?  Why spend 
on investment rather than on consumption? Who owns the new capital stock? Do actors 
have and care about an asset portfolio? Introduction of proper dynamics is necessary to 
answer these and other similar questions. 
 
 The question of private savings is also related to that of public savings and 
dissavings, as the case may be. But the government does more than simply generating 
savings or dissavings. It collects taxes, makes transfer payments and purchases goods 
and services. Through all these activities it can affect the flow of income and 
consumption of all or at least some socioeconomic groups. Hence, an intuitive link 
between government’s actions and poverty is justified. Later, we will see how this link 
can be made more explicit in a causal sense. For the moment, let us simply observe that 
                                                  
26 Therefore, this is properly described as a comparative statics exercise with the chain of 
causality starting with the exogenous change in foreign savings and ending with a new 
trade balance. 
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in most CGE models government is a rules-based (but not necessarily a utility 
maximizing) actor. Typically, the monetary side is absent or sketchy. Usually, there is a 
flow-of-funds specification, but no consideration of how the government finances its 
deficit. There is simply a crowding out of private investment. 
 
 Thus, the trade balance, private saving-investment balance and the public 
sector balance are all treated in a somewhat ad hoc fashion, but in a way this treatment 
broadly respects the relative price flexibility in the Walrasian spirit. However, the 
previous discussion also raises the question of including dynamic considerations 
explicitly. In particular asset endowments, markets and expectational dynamics may 
need to be included. Opening up the model in this way, also carries the danger of 
making it less tractable. This explains why dynamic CGE models to this day are not as 
well developed as a reasonable theoretical critique would demand. It would seem 
reasonable, for example, to expect that an “ecumenical” approach could postulate the 
possibility of unemployment, informal labor markets, financial markets for various 
assets and their relation to the real sectors. Such a “realistic” model could better capture 
the location and dynamics of poverty among other things. Better policy analysis 
prospects may be an important motivation for searching for such models. However, this 
is beyond the scope of this paper. What can not be ignored in an exercise in poverty 
analysis even if it is technically limited to comparative statics is the distributional side I 
now turn to a consideration of distribution within CGE models leading towards the 
formulation of an appropriate model for South Asia. 
 
 31
 
 
 
6.2 Income Distribution, poverty and dualism: 
 
The seminal contribution by Adelman and Robinson(1979) had used an implicit SAM to 
capture both factorial and household income distribution in a disaggregated manner. At 
about the same time the work of Lysy and Taylor(1980) focused on Brazil and made 
distributional aspects a part of the overall analysis. Dervis, De Melo and 
Robinson(1982) also addressed distributional issues in the general equilibrium 
modelling context. However, real concern with distribution and poverty analysis started 
towards the end of 1980s, after a decade of structural adjustment policies. Under the 
aegis of the OECD, Thorbecke (1991) for Indonesia, de Janvry, Sadoulet and 
Fargeix( 1991) for Ecuador, Morrison(1991) for Morocco and Chia, Wahba and 
Whalley for the Ivory Coast are some modelling examples from this “second 
generation” of CGE models for developing countries that addressed  income 
distribution and welfare issues in greater detail than before.A number of papers by 
Bourguignon and others also contributed to this stream.27 
 
 We can summarize the main analytical developments in modelling distribution 
upto this point by noting that these first and second generation models relied on a 
representative household assumption and fixed distributional coefficients for the 
household income distribution. Therefore, the analysis of poor households was 
necessarily coarse. No information about intra representative household income 
distribution and poverty was sought or used. The multiplier decomposition models of 
Thorbecke and Jung(1996) for poverty analysis in Indonesia and Khan(1999) for South 
Africa also share this weakness.  
 
 However, by utilizing the information in household income and expenditure 
surveys, it is now possible to generate intrahousehold groups income distribution and 
poverty profiles. It is also possible to use these profiles as part of the initial calibrating 
exercise in CGE models. A set of recent modelling efforts have been directed in 
precisely this direction.28 Here, the paper by Decaluwé, Bernard, A. Patry, Luc Savard, 
                                                  
27 See in particular, Bourguignon, F., J. de Melo, and A. Suwa, 1989. Distributional Effects of 
Adjustment Policies: Simulations for Two Archetype Economies, Background Paper for 1990 WDR, 
World Bank. 
Bourguignon, F., J. de Melo, and A. Suwa, 1991. Modelling the Effects of Adjustment Programmes on 
Income Distribution, World Development.19:11 1527-1544. 
Bourguignon, F., W. Branson, and J. de Melo, 1989. Adjustment and Income Distribution: A 
Counterfactual Analysis. World Bank, PPR Working Paper 215. 
For a concise review of recent issues in both macro and micro aspects of poverty analysis, see 
Bourguignon, F., L. Pereira da Silva and N. Stern (2002), Evaluating the Poverty Impact of Economic 
Policies: Some Analytical Challenges, draft paper, World Bank. 
28
 See Decaluwé, Bernard, A. Patry, Luc Savard, and Erik Thorbecke, 1999. Poverty Analysis within a 
General Equilibrium Framework. Working Paper No. 99-09, African Economic Research 
Consortium (June). 
Also Dorosh, Paul A. and David E. Sahn, 2000, “A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Effect of 
Macroeconomic Adjustment on Poverty in Africa, Journal of Policy Modelling 22(6):753-776. 
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and Erik Thorbecke (1999) is a pioneering piece. Another paper by Decaluwé, Dumont 
and Savard (1999)  tests the relevance of intrahousehold distributional information for 
poverty analysis. Based on an archetypal economy with four areas of activity 
(agriculture, industry, marketable and nonmarketable services), three factors of 
production (capital, skilled and unskilled labor) and four types of agents(rest of the 
world, government, firms and households), their approach is to isolate the contribution 
of average income variations, poverty line changes, and income distributional changes 
and then to look at the effect of these variations on various poverty indicators. Their 
results are unambiguous. They clearly highlight the relevance and significance of 
intrahousehold group information. Of the three influences they discuss, the changes in 
poverty line in a price-endogenous model accounts for most of the changes in poverty. 
Therefore, both intra-household group information and price endogeneity that allows us 
to compute a new nominal poverty line after each policy change are important. Azis 
(2002) is an example of the use of this approach for analyzing poverty after the Asian 
financial crisis.29.Another set of papers exemplified by Cogneau and Robillard (2000) 
and Cororaton (2003) utilizes the household expenditure survey results to carry out 
microsimulations. Here each household is treated effectively as an individual economic 
agent and its decisions are modeled directly. 
 
 Since  the purpose of this paper is to see if there are” generic” models of 
poverty analysis within the CGE family of models applicable to South Asia, I now turn 
to a detailed discussion and evaluation of a generic model which is a slight modification 
of Stifel and Thorbecke(2003) and present the empirical results from my work on South 
Asia. 
 
                                                  
29 See Azis, Iwan J.(2002), A New Approach to Modelling the Impacts of Financial Crises on 
Income Distribution and Poverty,Tokyo: ADBI Research Paper no. 35. 
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7. Results from the “Dual-Dual” CGE Model and their Interpretation :Poverty 
Analysis in a Generic CGE Model for South Asia 
 
 
 
 Among the models mentioned in the previous section, the closest to being a 
generic model is the Stifel-Thorbecke (2003) model of an archetype African economy. 
They build a CGE model in order to simulate the welfare effects of trade liberalization. 
In particular, their effort is directed towards an analysis of the effects of trade 
liberalization on poverty. They use what can be called a “dual-dual” frame work 
(Thorbecke,1993,1994,1997). This corresponds to the characteristics of a  developing 
economy with not only the traditional and modern sectors but also a kind of dualism 
within each of these sectors in terms of formal/informal dichotomy.30 Furthermore, the 
process of development for economies at a higher level of development may modify the 
traditional sector further in the direction of a more market-based modern sector. 
 
 Briefly, the coexistence and distribution of modern and informal type of 
activities in both rural and urban areas are taken as basic structural features of the 
economy in question. According to the authors their modelling approach integrates 
poverty analysis with CGE proper “… by endogenizing both intra-group income 
distributions and the nominal poverty line”. Following this line of work leads to their 
being able to assess policy repercussions on both poverty specific to particular 
socioeconomic groups and on overall national poverty. 
 
 The starting point is the dual economy models of Lewis(1954) and Fei and 
Ranis (1964)31. These pioneering efforts, however, could not or did not take into 
account the co-presence of dualism within each sector of the two sector models of the 
dual economy. Erik Thorbecke first raised this issue in 1979 during the course of a 
National Science Foundation interdisciplinary project on technology and development 
and Svejnar and Thorbecke (1982) was the first published work on a prototypical of 
dual-dual technology classification scheme. Khan (1982a,b) and Khan(1983) were 
applications of this scheme to the energy and textiles sectors in South Korea. Khan 
(1983)  raised the issue of linking technological dualism to poverty theoretically, 
following an early observation of Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976). Khan and 
Thorbecke(1988,1989) were further applications of technological dualism to Indonesia.  
 
 In Thorbecke’s later classification a rural/urban dichotomy is combined with 
traditional/modern technological dualism, leading to a fourfold classificatory scheme.32 
The four broadly defined sectors in this scheme are: 
                                                  
30
 See also, Svejnar and Thorbecke (1980,1982), Khan(1983,1985,1997). In these analyses, the particular 
country chosen was South Korea in the 1970s. Instead of CGE flex-price models, SAM-based models of 
fixed price variety were used. 
31
 See Khan (1997) chs. 2 and 3 for a historical survey and a specific intertemporal dualistic model which 
is used to analyze the conflict between employment and output. 
32
 See Svejnar-Thorbecke(1980,1982) and Khan(1983) for early developments. 
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1. subsistence agriculture with traditional labor-intensive technologies, family 
farms and food crops for domestic consumption; 
 
2. large scale agriculture producing mostly export crops using capital-intensive 
technology. 
 
3. the urban informal sector defined in an operational manner; 
 
4. modern sector with industry and services in the urban areas. 
 
Poverty analysis in this dual-dual model proceeds along the lines developed by 
Decaluwé, Bernard, A. Patry, Luc Savard, and Erik Thorbecke (1999). This approach 
relies on varying prices and a fixed commodity basket to derive an endogenous 
(nominal) poverty line every time there is a shock resulting in a new equilibrium price 
vector for the economy. It also uses a beta distribution with varying parameters to 
capture differences in income distributions that are group specific. Within each group 
also the parameters can vary, resulting in a new distribution. Standard poverty measures 
are applied to pre-policy shock and post-policy shock income distributions to derive the 
impact on poverty. I have modified the model on the production side by replacing the 
Cobb-Douglas production functions of the Stifel-Thorbecke model with more general 
CES production functions. The trade liberalization policies’ impact on poverty reduction 
are given for this new, CES specification in this paper.As is well known, on the 
production side, the latter specification allows a choice from a much wider range of 
elasticities than does the Cobb-Douglas production function. On the distribution side, 
Cobb-Douglas production functions with the unitary elasticity of substitution imply 
fixed factor shares. Thus CES functions( of Cobb-Douglas production functions is a 
special case) allow more flexibility on both the production and the distribution sides.Of 
course, the actual elasticities of sectoral production functions are empirical issues. But 
for this reason in particular, Cobb-Douglas production functions with the unitary 
elasticity of substitution may be a priori too restrictive.  The equations of the modified 
model are as follows: 
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Representation of Dual-Dual Model with CES Production Functions(complete 
description of the notation is given in appendix II) 
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The production sectors are specified as CES with the choice of nonunitary33 elasticities 
                                                  
33 Stifel-Thorbecke paper uses Cobb-Douglas production functions with elasticities of substitution 
restricted to a value of 1. 
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of substitution for the two formal sector commodities in equations 1 and 2. The informal 
sector commodities also have CES specifications. All commodities are produced under 
capital constraints. Thus, capital, K, in each sector has an upper bound denoted by a bar 
above K. The assumption that capital stock is fixed in each sector may be relaxed, but it 
is in fact, a fairly standard assumption for developing economies. 
 
 In the informal sectors each worker receives her average revenue product. 
Rural small holders may work on common land and these rural farming households may 
share the total income equally among all the family members. Urban informal workers 
supply all their labor at the prevailing wage rate. Thus leisure is not an argument in their 
objective function. This may be defended as an extreme assumption when people are at 
the margins of subsistence. Equations 5 and 6 show the informal sectors’ income 
determination. 
 
 The total income per unit includes logically the returns also to nonlabor assets 
for those who own land or capital. Hence, the relevant measure of income is total 
income per unit from all sources. 
The profit maximizing rural large landholders ensure that under competitive conditions 
wages for unskilled workers in the export sector are equal to the marginal revenue 
product of the unskilled labor they have to hire. Equation 7 reflects this condition. 
 
Equation 8 shows the equilibrium allocation of unskilled labor in the rural 
informal sector. In equilibrium, the rural sector wage rate is below the wage rate in the 
formal sector by a fixed factor. This reflects the assumption  that there are transactions 
costs in working in the rural formal sector that is captured by this mark up.34 
                                                  
34 Alternatively, one could also postulate that there is an ‘insider’ market wage equilibrium 
in the formal sector, and those unskilled workers lucky enough ( or more likely, because 
they know someone already working in the formal sector) to get a job in the formal sector  
can enjoy this wage premium. This is not a hypothesis the authors consider, but the data 
will be consistent with this hypothesis as well. 
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 Turning now to the import sector, for unskilled workers in the urban area the 
assumption here is that they get the income per unit of labor in the urban services sector 
(shown in equation 9) plus a share of the profits as given in equation 10. The profit 
determination itself is shown in equation 11.  
 
The Harris-Todaro model features regarding rural-urban migration are captured 
in equation 12. Here, in equilibrium, rural wage must equal the expected wage in the 
urban sector. In equation 12, the probability of getting a job in the import sector is given 
by the share of the urban uneducated labor force in that  particular sector multiplied by 
a scale parameter, h. 
 
 Skilled workers are employed only in the formal sectors. Their wages are 
determined in equations 13 and 14 by their marginal revenue products. We now turn to 
the determination of incomes for the households. 
 
 
Household Income Determination: 
 
There are nine types of households. Two in the rural area are landowning households--- 
large and small. There are also urban capitalists and bureaucrats. The other five are 
households where the main source of income is from labor. 
 
The rural informal households which are really rural small holders receive their 
total revenue from production as shown in equation 16. Rural unskilled and skilled 
households receive their wage incomes as shown in equations 17 and 18 respectively. 
Equation 19 gives the incomes of the rural large land holders. 
 
Equations 20- 24 show the incomes of the urban households. The working class 
households receive wage income and the capitalists the profit incomes, in general. The 
bureaucratic households capture part of the rents from imports by colluding with the 
rent seekers.35 
The formal sector employers (rural large land owners and urban capitalists) are the only 
savers in the model. They each save a constant fraction of their nominal incomes. 
 
Household demand functions are captured by maximization of Cobb-Douglas 
utility functions subject to their income constraints. There are 23 such equations 
(equations 27-49) because the four rural household groups have access to only food and 
importables. This gives us eight equations. Each of the urban groups has access to three 
commodities--- food, importables and urban services. This gives another 15 equations. 
The prices for the three commodities can be used to define an overall deflator. 
 
Foreign Trade: 
 
Imports in this model are the difference between domestic demand and production of 
                                                  
35 Salaries are excluded in equation 24. The reasoning is that these are invariant to 
exogenous shocks. 
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import competing sector. Exports can be supplied at the prevailing price up to any 
quantity under the small country assumption. Thus exports are equal to total output less 
the savings in the form of exportables of the rural large landholders. Equations 50 and 
51 show the import and export demand functions respectively. 
 
 
Equilibrium conditions for the model as a whole: 
 
There are two sets of equilibrium conditions in the model. First, the labor market 
equilibrium conditions are given by equations 52 and 53. There is disguised 
unemployment, as discussed before, but no formal involuntary unemployment. The 
second set of equilibrium conditions given by equations 50 and 51 is that the domestic 
demand for the informal sector goods and services is matched by domestic supply. 
Prices in the formal sectors are set by the world market prices The export price is 
normalized to one. The import price is equal to 1+t, where t is the tariff rate . Exchange 
rate is held fixed during the particular modelling period. It is clear that the current 
account balance must be exogenous. In line with our discussion in the previous section, 
this balance is equal to foreign savings which are assumed to be zero here. Hence 
current account balance is assumed to be zero.36 The SAM below in table 1 which is 
largely compiled from data for India below summarizes the relevant information for our 
generic South Asian economy. Note that in the SAM, the labor and capital are shown in 
aggregate forms; but in actual modeling exercise these are further disaggregated as 
discussed during the model description above.37 
                                                  
36 Implicitly, this amounts to claiming for a reforming economy(see section 5 above) that 
the stabilization policies indeed succeed in restoring the external balance. 
37 Namely, skilled and unskilled labor, and capital and agricultural capital. 
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Table 1: SAM for a generic dual-dual South Asian Economy                 
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6,161.51  
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343.58     
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6  
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Poverty Analysis in the Generic Model:  
  
In order to carry out the poverty analysis, it is important to realize that the extent of 
poverty is unevenly spread across different households. The sources of income poverty 
can be traced to the sources of income of the various households. Table 2 below gives 
the factorial sources of household incomes of poor households in the model economy. 
The numbers are hypothetical and are the same as Stifel- Thorbecke’s specifications.  
 
TABLE 2: FACTORIAL SOURCE OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME (%) 
 Unskilled labor Skilled labor Capital Agricultural capital Total 
Rural small holders   75.0     25.0  
100.0 
Rural unskilled  100.0     
100.0 
Rural skilled   100.0    
100.0 
Rural large holders     100.0  
100.0 
Urban informal   75.0     25.0   
100.0 
Urban unskilled  100.0     
100.0 
Urban skilled   100.0    
100.0 
Urban capitalists    100.0   
100.0 
 
 
 
Among all the household groups, rural smallholders have  the second lowest average 
income and they have the second  highest incidence of poverty. The highest incidence 
of poverty is found among the urban informal households. As table 2 shows they derive 
75 percent of their income from wages in the unskilled labor market and 25 per cent 
from capital. 
 
 Table 3 below shows the initial mean incomes and population shares before the 
policy experiment. This has been created by taking the demographic and other 
characteristics of households in South Asia---particularly in India and Bangladesh. This 
table also shows the headcount measure of poverty rates for each of the household 
groups that earn at least some labor income. It ignores three household groups, however. 
The groups thus ignored are rural large landholders, urban capitalists and bureaucrats. 
The reason is simple. None of these households are assumed to be in poverty, nor does 
the particular policy shock results in poverty for any of these three groups. 
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TABLE 3: INITIAL INCOME AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 
HOUSEHOLDS IN THE LABOR MARKET 
 Mean income Population share Percent poor 
Rural small-holders               1.00        0.41     90.20 
Rural unskilled  1.05        0.01     20.57 
Rural skilled 1.75        0.01     21.18 
Urban informal               0.92        0.38     74.71 
Urban unskilled               1.95        0.05       5.34 
Urban skilled               3.50        0.09       1.49 
 
From table 3 above, it appears that the mean incomes have a wide range----from 0.92 
for the urban informal workers to 3.50 for the urban skilled workers. These incomes are 
scaled relative to the pre-tariff import price which is the numeraire in the model. Among 
the skilled groups, the richest are in the urban sector. For the unskilled also, the urban 
unskilled group has the highest income, for reasons explained previously. Rural 
smallholders (41 per cent of the population) and other households with low education 
and skills such as rural unskilled, urban informal and urban unskilled comprise about 
80% of the total population and almost all of the poor come from these groups. 
Contrarily, households comprising of highly educated and skilled workers account for 
about 10 per cent of the total population and only 0.4% of those below the poverty line 
come from these groups. 
 
 For an adequate analysis of the policy impact on poverty one needs not just the 
information about the composition of households and their mean incomes, but also on 
the intragroup income distributions. As mentioned before, the statistical distribution 
function chosen to fit the various degrees of mean, variance, skewness and other 
features is the Beta Distribution. This choice allows a certain flexibility. The density 
functions can be either symmetric or asymmetric. They can also be skewed to the left or 
to the right. Of course, the choice of parameters that will result in a particular shape of 
the distribution function can not be arbitrary, but really should be guided by the actual 
shapes, or some information regarding these shapes, of the distribution functions for 
each particular group of households. Here, well-designed and accurate household 
surveys can lead to a much improved policy analysis. In this particular exercise, the 
assumption of within group distributional neutrality after the policy shock is maintained. 
Therefore, the impact on poverty comes from mainly the growth effects of the policy. A 
second, significant feature, however, is the urban-rural migration after the policy shock. 
This also affects the poverty reduction possibilities of liberalization, as we will see 
shortly. 
 
 
Policy Simulation in the Model and Impact on Poverty: 
 
 
 Prior to the policy experiment of tariff liberalization, the urban skilled workers 
in the model economy enjoy the highest level of wages. Their average wages are exactly 
twice the level of the rural skilled, almost three times that of the urban unskilled and 
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more than three times that of the other three groups. 
 
 The trade policy experiment involves a tariff reduction that ranges from 87% to  
below 20%.38 The obvious and immediate effect is a drop in the price of imports and a 
relative increase in the price of exports.39 In keeping with the shape of the supply 
curves production rises for exports and falls for the import-competing 
sector.40Consistent with this, demand for both skilled and unskilled labor drops in the 
urban importables sector, and rises in the rural exportables sector. There is also a fall in 
the wages in the former sector, and a reverse migration out of this sector in the urban 
area to the export sector in the rural area. For this particular policy experiment, in the 
new general equilibrium, the  share of urban skilled workers falls by 9%. At the same 
time the share of rural skilled workers rises by about 22%.Correspondingly, there is also 
a movement of the unskilled workers from the urban to the rural area as well. Finally, 
the fall in the aggregate income in the urban formal sector reduces effective demand for 
the urban services sector as well, pushing out the urban informal sector workers towards 
the rural area also. 
 
 Table 4 below gives the results for poverty reduction. Two implicit 
assumptions underlie these results. First, individuals who migrate take on the 
socio-economic characteristics of the group in which they end up. Second, both the 
groups---i.e., the group from which the individual migrates and the group to which the 
individual worker migrates--- still have the same income distribution as before the 
migration. 
                                                  
38  This reflects approximately, the actual Indian policy changes and the consequent 
trajectory of tariffs. See Joshi and Little(2004(1996)), Virmani(2004) and Ahluwalia and 
Little(1998). A ‘generic’ set of experiments in tariff reductions starting with an index of 100 
and going down to 0 in steps of 10 per cent reductions is given in the appendix. 
39 The nominal price of exports which is the numeraire remains constant. 
40 The exact extent will naturally vary with the extent of relative price changes and the 
supply elasticities. 
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TABLE 4: CHANGES IN POVERTY 
 
 Base 
Case 
TX_87  
Sim_87_ 
20 Change 
 
Sim_20_ 
18  Change 
 
Sim_15_ 
12  Change 
National Poverty        
Poverty Headcount (P0) 24.56 24.417 -0.56% 24.08 -1.39% 24.42 0.00% 
Poverty Gap (P1) 5.60 5.607 0.18% 5.55 -1.11% 5.60 -0.02% 
Poverty Severity (P2) 2.09 2.092 0.14% 2.07 -1.00% 2.09 0.00% 
        
Poverty Headcount (P0)        
Rural Small-Holders 90.20 90.204 0.00% 89.39 -0.90% 90.20 0.00% 
Rural Unskilled 20.57 20.566 0.00% 19.87 -3.40% 20.57 0.00% 
Rural Skilled 21.18 21.178 0.00% 20.82 -1.70% 21.18 0.00% 
Rural Capitalist - 0  -  -  
Urban Informal 74.71 74.014 -0.93% 74.01 0.00% 74.01 0.00% 
Urban Unskilled 5.34 4.577 -14.29% 3.81 -16.67% 4.58 0.00% 
Urban Skilled 1.49 1.49 0.00% 1.49 0.00% 1.49 0.00% 
Urban Capitalist - 0  -  -  
        
Poverty Gap (P1)        
Rural Small-Holders 26.91 26.961 0.18% 26.72 -0.88% 26.91 -0.01% 
Rural Unskilled 0.99 1.003 1.21% 0.94 -6.48% 0.99 -0.10% 
Rural Skilled 1.93 1.947 0.83% 1.87 -4.21% 1.93 -0.05% 
Rural Capitalist - 0  -  -  
Urban Informal 27.09 27.087 -0.02% 27.02 -0.26% 27.09 0.00% 
Urban Unskilled 0.16 0.158 0.00% 0.15 -3.80% 0.16 0.00% 
Urban Skilled 0.02 0.015 0.00% 0.01 -20.00% 0.02 0.00% 
Urban Capitalist - 0  -  -  
        
Poverty Severity (P2)        
Rural Small-Holders 10.51 10.535 0.25% 10.41 -1.17% 10.51 -0.02% 
Rural Unskilled 0.07 0.075 1.35% 0.07 -8.00% 0.07 0.00% 
Rural Skilled 0.23 0.237 1.28% 0.22 -5.91% 0.23 0.00% 
Rural Capitalist - 0  -  -  
Urban Informal 11.73 11.722 -0.03% 11.68 -0.39% 11.72 -0.01% 
Urban Unskilled 0.01 0.008 0.00% 0.01 -12.50% 0.01 0.00% 
Urban Skilled - 0  -  -  
Urban Capitalist - 0  -  -  
 
Note: Poverty measures are all multiplied by 100. 
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Under the assumptions, the results within the model show that in general, both 
the extent and depth of poverty decline for each group. The largest headcount ratio drop 
is recorded for the rural unskilled group. Poverty severity also falls for each household 
group with the exception of the urban unskilled workers. But when the tariff rates fall 
from 15 to 12 percent, this group benefits as well. In general though, much of the 
poverty reduction impact of trade liberalization can be reaped earlier. Further reductions 
leading to a rate below 10 per cent may not have much more of an impact than earlier 
tariff reductions. One surprise, however, is the largely nonlinear impact of tariff 
reductions on poverty. Although there is a progressive gain from liberalization, there 
seems to be a big jump nationally when the rate is in the range of 15 to 18 per cent. 
However, there is very little change for even lower rates, for example,  from 15% to 
12%.Given the stylized nature of the exercise, no magical properties need to be 
attributed to these particular  numbers. The general lesson is that tariff reduction will 
ultimately benefit the poor; but the trickling down process is uneven and may require 
some time to work through the socio-economic system.   
 
 We look at the poverty gap squared measure next. From the results presented 
in table 4, it turns out that tariff reduction does lead to a reduction in poverty severity at 
18 per cent. However, the change in the national poverty measure is small--- a fall of  
only one per cent. This is consistent with the observation that trade liberalization may 
benefit initially those among the poor who are closer to the poverty line than those who 
are far below. It may leave unchanged the incomes of those who are well below the 
poverty line. But the good news surely is that when tariffs are sufficiently low, some of 
the poorest may finally begin to benefit.  
 
 Scrutinizing table 4 carefully, it can be seen that for the various household 
groups the headcount jump is relatively more significant for several of the rural 
household groups. In particular, both the rural skilled and unskilled household groups 
experience significant changes in poverty reduction at the lower tariff rates. For urban 
unskilled the changes are  even larger absolutely  but are relatively less dramatic and 
more monotonic over an entire range of gradually declining tariff schedules.. However, 
for the poverty gap measure, the poverty reduction effects shown are much smaller for 
this group. By contrast, the urban skilled household group via higher wages and better 
employment opportunities experiences a further reduction of about 20% when tariff 
rates are reduced from 20 to 18 per cent. However, this group has fewer poor 
households to begin with. Hence, the overall impact on national poverty reduction is 
small. 
 
In terms of the change in poverty severity measure, the urban unskilled show 
the greatest improvement. This group is followed by rural unskilled, rural skilled and 
rural smallholders. Thus an overall average tariff rate reduction target all the way down 
to the  range of 10 to 20 per cent range seems a reasonable trade liberalization policy 
objective for a South Asian economy from a poverty reduction perspective..  
 
 However, a cautionary note needs to be sounded so that there is a sense of 
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realism about the potential of trade liberalization alone to meet the overall  poverty 
reduction targets. Although the positive effect on national poverty is clearly discernible 
within our model with the results derived from South Asian data, the absolute amount is 
not as high as it would need to be given the poverty reduction targets of the Millenium 
Development Goals, for instance. In part this is because of migrations taking place from 
both high paying to low paying and vice versa. The net effect is smaller than it would 
have been if only low paying to high paying job migration were taking place. One needs 
a dynamic model to trace out these movements over time and also to estimate the 
dynamic benefits of liberalization. This is an important future task although beyond the 
scope of the present paper.41 
 
                                                  
41 For recent work on some of the dynamic connections via productivity increases see Alcala 
and Ciccone(2004) and the references therein. 
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8. Conclusions and Prospects for Future Work on 
Asian Developing Economies 
 
 
.  
 
 In this paper, it has been argued that a generic CGE model for analyzing the 
poverty impact of various economic reforms in South Asia can be built. As a first step, 
trade liberalization is taken as the specific policy experiment for examination.The 
specific generic model for South Asia incorporating dualism and rural-urban and 
urban-rural migration within a Harris-Todaro framework reveals a number of specific 
features of the connections between trade liberalization and poverty reduction. 
 
      Within this particular CGE model, the policy experiments show that in this 
region trade liberalization can lead to further poverty reduction. This is true at both the 
national level and at the level of the various household groups. This is indeed good 
news that conforms to the general prediction of the standard comparative advantage 
based trade theory. 
 
However, the extent of poverty reduction impact of trade liberalization turns 
out to be limited. There are several reasons for this. The main reason is that the 
Harris-Todaro mechanism allows reverse migration to lower paid jobs for the 
potentially unemployed as protection is removed. Furthermore, the impact of further 
tariff reductions becomes attenuated for most groups when the tariff levels are lowered 
sufficiently. On the whole, the high tariff barriers should be dismantled, but beyond a 
certain point---say about 15 per cent average tariff rate--- the further impacts become 
negligible. 
 
Several policy conclusions can be reached regarding poverty reduction 
strategies in South Asia in light of the findings here. Trade liberalization certainly does 
not conflict with poverty reduction and hence can be pursued without fearing adverse 
poverty impact. However, the approach may need to be a firm but gradual liberalization 
with special sensitivity to agriculture and the rural poor. It should also be kept in mind 
that trade liberalization can certainly help reduce poverty, but by itself it may not be the 
magic bullet against poverty. The actual poverty reduction impact in South Asia is most 
likely to remain small for this policy instrument. Hence other growth enhancing reforms 
need to be pursued simultaneously. Targeted poverty reduction programs may also be 
needed with emphasis on increasing the efficiency of targeting and improving their 
cost-effectiveness.Programs such as food-for–work and other employment 
schemes,microfinance, agricultural credit etc. need to be pursued with a focus on 
making them more effective in terms of reaching the targeted groups at minimum cost 
to the programs. Rural industrialization and increase in productivity through investment 
in social sectors and human capital also remain viable policy options. In terms of Sen’s 
capabilities approach, the capabilities of the poor--- particularly their basic 
functionings--- need to be enhanced so that they can better participate in income earning 
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activities. 
 
Turning now to some methodological issues for future work,  there are at least 
four categories of Asian economies--- broadly speaking--- that could be the subject of 
CGE modeling exercises regarding the poverty reduction implications of trade 
liberalization. First, we have low income countries of South Asia. Here, a model based 
on an economy such as India or Bangladesh could offer some insights. This is indeed 
what has been attempted here. The second category would include middle income Asian 
Developing countries such as Indonesia. The third and fourth categories will include the 
transitional low and middle income economies in Asia, for example, Viet Nam and PRC 
respectively.. As any student of the Asian Developing Economies  will quickly point 
out, the four categories are not exhaustive, but they do cover a large number of country 
cases including the most populous poor countries with a large number of poor people. 
 
Addressing all the structural and institutional issues even in each of the four 
categories is  beyond the scope of this paper. However, as a beginning, the case of 
India has been studied here. In Asian economies such as India, the low level of income 
and pervasive poverty present a prima facie case for a policy focus on poverty reduction. 
However, there has only been  mixed success  in poverty reduction so far. One reason 
is that over the past few decades, the growth record has also been somewhat mixed. 
There have also been macroeconomic imbalances in the form of high fiscal deficit, low 
domestic savings, and sizable external account deficit. Consequently, both inflation and 
interest rates were high, making the economic environment unfriendly to adequate and 
accelerated investment. In the wake of the policy focus on macroeconomic balancing, 
the growth and poverty impacts of such policies are natural candidates for rigorous 
investigation within the CGE tradition of modeling. 
 India is one of the ‘big five’ in Asia along with PRC, Bangladesh, Pakistan 
and Indonesia in terms of both population and poverty . These five Asian countries 
comprise three fifths of the world’s population and two fifths of poor people. The next 
step may be to move to the case of a middle income Asian country such as Thailand or 
Indonesia with large numbers of poor. 
 It should be mentioned here that the modeling approach for the middle 
income countries will need to be an “extended” dual-dual approach. Since these 
economies are more diversified with relatively more developed financial sectors, the 
incorporation of these details may take us well beyond the dual-dual model used here. 
For transitional economies a different set of structural features may need to be 
considered. For example, the presence of state owned enterprises and financial controls 
of various sorts will need to be modeled. These are some fruitful directions for future 
research. 
Finally, one important methodological issue is the level of aggregation on the 
household side. Clearly, the use of a fully disaggregated data set on the household side 
removes the compulsion of using the always-somewhat-arbitrary classification of 
households into various socio-economic groups. Although we are still dealing with a 
sample of households and not the entire population, it can be argued that this “micro” 
picture is in some sense as accurate as we can get without enlarging the sample. When 
data are available, undertaking both group level and micro level poverty analysis can 
offer important insights.Therefore, micro poverty analysis in macromodels is a desirable 
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direction for research to follow. 
 
 
.To sum up, within a generic CGE model, the consequences of the trade 
liberalization part of the adjustment policies for allocation of resources, household 
income distribution of income and impact on poverty has been examined here in a way 
similar to the dual-dual approach pioneered by Thorbecke and others. Beginning with a  
solid understanding of the causality of household income distribution, production 
structure, migration patterns and factor markets emphasizing both formal and informal 
sectors, the model  incorporates the economy wide causality of income poverty in a 
transparent manner. Although the first stage of the modelling process has only aimed at 
comparative statics experiments, an eventual dynamic extension will clearly be 
desirable and possible.  The dynamic gains from trade---with proper redistributive 
mechanisms--- could indeed lead to a more rapid poverty reduction than the 
comparative statics exercise would indicate. This remains an urgent task within the CGE 
framework of analysis for all Asian Developing Economies. 
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Appendix I 
 
A Generic table for representation of poverty dynamics can be formulated as follows 
with simulation of 10% stepwise tax reduction. 
 
Table: Changes in Poverty 
 
Base 
100% 
Chg 
(%) SIM_100_90
Chg 
(%) SIM_90_80
Chg 
(%) SIM_80_70
Chg 
(%) 
National Poverty         
Poverty Headcount 
(P0) 24.5550  24.4170 -0.562% 24.3090 -0.442% 24.3090 0.000% 
Poverty Gap (P1) 5.5970  5.5980 0.018% 5.5940 -0.071% 5.5940 0.000% 
Poverty Severity (P2) 2.0890  2.0890 0.000% 2.0880 -0.048% 2.0880 0.000% 
         
Poverty Headcount (P0)        
Rural Small-Holders 90.2040  90.2040 0.000% 90.2040 0.000% 90.2040 0.000% 
Rural Unskilled 20.5660  20.5660 0.000% 20.5660 0.000% 20.5660 0.000% 
Rural Skilled 21.1780  21.1780 0.000% 20.8180 -1.700% 20.8180 0.000% 
Rural Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Informal 74.7060  74.0140 -0.926% 74.0140 0.000% 74.0140 0.000% 
Urban Unskilled 5.3400  4.5770 -14.288% 4.5770 0.000% 4.5770 0.000% 
Urban Skilled 1.4900  1.4900 0.000% 1.4900 0.000% 1.4900 0.000% 
Urban Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
         
Poverty Gap (P1)         
Rural Small-Holders 26.9120  26.9200 0.030% 26.9040 -0.059% 26.9030 -0.004% 
Rural Unskilled 0.9910  0.9930 0.202% 0.9880 -0.504% 0.9880 0.000% 
Rural Skilled 1.9310  1.9340 0.155% 1.9270 -0.362% 1.9270 0.000% 
Rural Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Informal 27.0930  27.0920 -0.004% 27.0860 -0.022% 27.0850 -0.004% 
Urban Unskilled 0.1580  0.1580 0.000% 0.1580 0.000% 0.1580 0.000% 
Urban Skilled 0.0150  0.0150 0.000% 0.0150 0.000% 0.0150 0.000% 
Urban Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
         
Poverty Severity 
(P2)         
Rural Small-Holders 10.5090  10.5140 0.048% 10.5050 -0.086% 10.5050 0.000% 
Rural Unskilled 0.0740  0.0740 0.000% 0.0740 0.000% 0.0740 0.000% 
Rural Skilled 0.2340  0.2350 0.427% 0.2340 -0.426% 0.2340 0.000% 
Rural Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Informal 11.7260  11.7260 0.000% 11.7220 -0.034% 11.7210 -0.009% 
Urban Unskilled 0.0080  0.0080 0.000% 0.0080 0.000% 0.0080 0.000% 
Urban Skilled 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
 
Table: continued 
 
SIM_70
_60 
Chg 
(%) 
SIM_
60_50 
Chg 
(%) SIM_50_40
Chg 
(%) SIM_40_30
Chg 
(%) 
National Poverty         
Poverty Headcount (P0) 24.3090 0.000% 24.3090 0.000% 24.3090 0.000% 24.3090 0.000% 
Poverty Gap (P1) 5.5940 0.000% 5.5930 -0.018% 5.5930 0.000% 5.5930 0.000% 
Poverty Severity (P2) 2.0870 -0.048% 2.0870 0.000% 2.0870 0.000% 2.0870 0.000% 
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Poverty Headcount (P0)         
Rural Small-Holders 90.2040 0.000% 90.2040 0.000% 90.2040 0.000% 90.2040 0.000% 
Rural Unskilled 20.5660 0.000% 20.5660 0.000% 20.5660 0.000% 20.5660 0.000% 
Rural Skilled 20.8180 0.000% 20.8180 0.000% 20.8180 0.000% 20.8180 0.000% 
Rural Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Informal 74.0140 0.000% 74.0140 0.000% 74.0140 0.000% 74.0140 0.000% 
Urban Unskilled 4.5770 0.000% 4.5770 0.000% 4.5770 0.000% 4.5770 0.000% 
Urban Skilled 1.4900 0.000% 1.4900 0.000% 1.4900 0.000% 1.4900 0.000% 
Urban Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
         
Poverty Gap (P1)         
Rural Small-Holders 26.9030 0.000% 26.9020 -0.004% 26.9020 0.000% 26.9000 -0.007% 
Rural Unskilled 0.9880 0.000% 0.9880 0.000% 0.9870 -0.101% 0.9870 0.000% 
Rural Skilled 1.9270 0.000% 1.9270 0.000% 1.9270 0.000% 1.9260 -0.052% 
Rural Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Informal 27.0850 0.000% 27.0840 -0.004% 27.0840 0.000% 27.0830 -0.004% 
Urban Unskilled 0.1580 0.000% 0.1580 0.000% 0.1580 0.000% 0.1580 0.000% 
Urban Skilled 0.0150 0.000% 0.0150 0.000% 0.0150 0.000% 0.0150 0.000% 
Urban Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
         
Poverty Severity (P2)         
Rural Small-Holders 10.5050 0.000% 10.5040 -0.010% 10.5040 0.000% 10.5040 0.000% 
Rural Unskilled 0.0740 0.000% 0.0740 0.000% 0.0740 0.000% 0.0740 0.000% 
Rural Skilled 0.2340 0.000% 0.2330 -0.427% 0.2330 0.000% 0.2330 0.000% 
Rural Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Informal 11.7210 0.000% 11.7210 0.000% 11.7200 -0.009% 11.7200 0.000% 
Urban Unskilled 0.0080 0.000% 0.0080 0.000% 0.0080 0.000% 0.0080 0.000% 
Urban Skilled 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
 
Table: continued 
 
SIM_30
_20 
Chg 
(%) 
SIM_
20_10 
Chg 
(%) SIM_10_0 
Chg 
(%) 
National Poverty       
Poverty Headcount (P0) 24.3090 0.000% 24.3090 0.000% 24.3090 0.000% 
Poverty Gap (P1) 5.5930 0.000% 5.5920 -0.018% 5.5920 0.000% 
Poverty Severity (P2) 2.0870 0.000% 2.0870 0.000% 2.0870 0.000% 
       
Poverty Headcount (P0)       
Rural Small-Holders 90.2040 0.000% 90.2040 0.000% 90.2040 0.000% 
Rural Unskilled 20.5660 0.000% 20.5660 0.000% 20.5660 0.000% 
Rural Skilled 20.8180 0.000% 20.8180 0.000% 20.8180 0.000% 
Rural Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Informal 74.0140 0.000% 74.0140 0.000% 74.0140 0.000% 
Urban Unskilled 4.5770 0.000% 4.5770 0.000% 4.5770 0.000% 
Urban Skilled 1.4900 0.000% 1.4900 0.000% 1.4900 0.000% 
Urban Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
       
Poverty Gap (P1)       
Rural Small-Holders 26.9000 0.000% 26.8990 -0.004% 26.8980 -0.004% 
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Rural Unskilled 0.9870 0.000% 0.9870 0.000% 0.9860 -0.101% 
Rural Skilled 1.9260 0.000% 1.9260 0.000% 1.9250 -0.052% 
Rural Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Informal 27.0820 -0.004% 27.0810 -0.004% 27.0810 0.000% 
Urban Unskilled 0.1570 -0.633% 0.1570 0.000% 0.1570 0.000% 
Urban Skilled 0.0150 0.000% 0.0150 0.000% 0.0150 0.000% 
Urban Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
       
Poverty Severity (P2)       
Rural Small-Holders 10.5030 -0.010% 10.5030 0.000% 10.5030 0.000% 
Rural Unskilled 0.0740 0.000% 0.0740 0.000% 0.0740 0.000% 
Rural Skilled 0.2330 0.000% 0.2330 0.000% 0.2330 0.000% 
Rural Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Informal 11.7190 -0.009% 11.7190 0.000% 11.7180 -0.009% 
Urban Unskilled 0.0080 0.000% 0.0080 0.000% 0.0080 0.000% 
Urban Skilled 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Urban Capitalist 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
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Appendix II 
Notation and symbol explanation: 
Production and Labor Market 
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Eqn 1-2: output of formal sector [superscript/subscript; fc=formal sector commodities] 
X=output in formal sector; A=Technology coefficient; K=Fixed capital; β=share of 
input in output; LS= skilled labor; LU=unskilled labor; µ=elasticity of substitution; 
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Eqn 3-4: output in informal sector [superscript/subscript; ic=informal sector 
commodities] 
X=output in formal sector; A=Technology coefficient; K=Fixed capital; β=share of 
input in output; LS= skilled labor; LU=unskilled labor; µ=elasticity of substitution; 
)6()5......(.......... −=
ic
icic
ic LU
XPi  
iic=income in informal sector (wage in informal sector is determined) 
)7......(..........
ex
ex
ex
LUex
ex LU
XP
wu
β
=  
wuex= unskilled labor wage in export sector [subscript ex is used for export sector 
representation]; β=share of input in output 
)8..().........1( δ+= foodex iwu  
δ= Transaction costs of work in rural formal sector (export) instead of working in food 
sector (for unskilled labor) ; ifood=income in food sector 
)9......(..........
im
im
im
LUim
srvc LU
XPi β=  
isrvc=income in service sector of unskilled workers 
)10......(..........
im
srvcim LU
iw Π+= γ  
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wim= wages in import competing industry; γ=profit share ratio for unskilled labor in 
import competing sector; Π=profits; 
)11.....(..........imimimsrvcimim LSwsLUiXP −−=Π  
Π=profits of capitalists; wsim=skilled labor wage; 
)12......(..........)()1( im
imsrvc
im
srvc
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ex wuLULU
hLU
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+
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−=  
h= scale parameter 
)14()13......(.......... −=
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LSfc
fc LS
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wsfc= skilled wage in formal sector 
)15......(..........)1()1(
1 1
1
exim
LU
im
LU
im
LU
im wsws
θ
βθβθ
β −⎥⎦
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⎡
−+−
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=  
wsim= skilled wage in import competing sector; θ= relative risk aversion of skilled 
workers 
Disposable income and savings 
)16......(..........foodfoodrih LUiI =  
Irih= disposable income of rural informal household 
)17......(..........exexruh LUwuI =  
Iruh= disposable income of rural unskilled household 
)18......(..........exexrsh LSwsI =  
Irsh= disposable income of rural skilled household 
)19......(..........exexexexexexexrlh SLUwuLSwsXPI −−−=  
Irlh= disposable income of rural large landholders household 
)20......(..........srvcsrvcuih LUiI =  
Iuih= disposable income of urban informal household 
)21......(..........imimuuh LUwsI =  
Iuuh= disposable income of rural unskilled household 
)22......(..........imimush LSwsI =  
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Iush= disposable income of urban unskilled household 
)23......(..........imimimimimimimukh SLUwuLSwsXPI −−−=  
Iukh= disposable income of urban capitalist household 
)24......(..........tMIbch =  
Ibch= disposable income of bureaucrat household 
)26()25.......(].........[ −−−= fcfcfcfcfcfcfcfc LUwuLSwsXPS λ  
S=savings of formal sector employers (urban capitalists and rural large landholders) 
Demand 
)49()27......(.......... −=
c
h
h
ch
c P
IC α  
α=budget share of commodities; I=household income; C=consumption of commodities 
by households; P=price of commidites; 
 
Foreign Trade 
)50......(..........im
im
im
h
h
im XP
SCM −+=∑  
M=import; C= demand for imported commodities; S=savings of capitalists; P=price of 
imported commodities; X=output in import competing sector; 
)51.....(..........
ex
ex
ex P
SXEX −=  
EX=export; X=output in export sector; S=savings of rural capitalists (large 
landholders); P=price of export commodities; 
Equilibrium Conditions 
)52......(..........∑ =c c LULU  
)53......(..........∑ =fc fc LSLS  
)55()54......(.......... −=∑h hicic CX  
)56......(..........1 tPim +≡  
P=price of imports; t= tariff rate 
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)57......(..........1≡exP  
P=price of exports 
 
